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Reputation models are widely in use today in commercial transaction (ebay), product review
(amazon, epinions), and news commentary websites (slashdot). The purpose of these reputation
models is to provide behavioral or informational data for future users to determine whether or
not he or she will trust the data. These models are dependent on explicit feedback mechanisms
where users rate product, other users, or information. However, for many popular social network
information sources on the web, no such explicit feedback systems exist where users rate information
in order for consumers of this information to be able to judge the trustworthiness of the data source
or the data itself.
Here I describe the layers of the problem of determining reputation among users or data during
events discussed on social networks, and evaluate data and network analysis methods from varying
disciplines that may implicitly infer user or data reputation based on metadata, user relationships
and user actions in social networks. I demonstrate that the HITS algorithm is not effective at
finding influential users, and propose a new algorithm and demonstrate its effectiveness for finding
influential users during an event.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Early commercial uses of the internet revolved around online retail sales with sites like Ama-
zon1 and the popular auctioneering site EBay.2 The problem faced by early users of these sites
was a lack of information about goods sold on the retail sites (Is this book or audio CD any good?)
or behavioral history of users in auctions (Does this user pay and deliver quickly?). Explicit repu-
tation systems were developed by these sites and others with similar needs in order to rate users’
behavior and record transaction history.
On the internet today, nearly fifteen years after Amazon and EBay began their businesses,
there is no end to the amount of information one is able to encounter. Google’s page index count
reached one trillion pages in July of 2008 [46] and continues to grow, and with the abundance of
information online – whether that information is in news articles, blog posts, wikipedia entries,
forums, or random messages on social networking sites like Twitter or Facebook – the task of
sorting through that information to determine relevance or validity of claims requires significant
effort on the part of the consumer of that information. In addition to the numerous amateur and
professional news websites, many content management systems (CMS) such as Wordpress3 are
freely available to allow the average home internet user to create content to be posted publicly.
Some studies into user generated content (UGC) reveal an immense amount of information
is both created and shared daily via different online services, including 65,000 new video uploads
1 http://www.amazon.com
2 http://www.ebay.com
3 http://www.wordpress.com
2per day on the YouTube4 service [20], and over 11.1 million unique photos favorited over 34.7
million times on the Flickr5 photo sharing service [21]. Other work discusses people’s desire to
share personal information or opinions in blogs [83], in small microupdates in Twitter [57] [68], and
in wall posts on Facebook and other sites [79] [23].
One of the main issues with this abundance of information from both organizations and
individuals with varying credentials is that users of the internet are inundated with too much
information. Sorting through this large volume of information to verify or dispute user posts or
news articles becomes a very difficult task, especially considering the variability and often conflicting
nature of information online. Internet users will attempt to verify or dispute claims through their
own searches, through their own experience [59], or make a decision based solely on content [35].
Similar to the need for explicit rating systems described by online commerce, a need now exists to
determine the reputation for people and information online that are not explicitly rated.
I seek to answer the question, “are there tools available to determine influential users in social
networks in the context of a specific event?” This question is the first sub-problem of the larger
question, “are there tools available to infer reputation about users or content in social networks?”
In this research, I investigate different tools and analysis methods gathered from varying science
disciplines that may be employed to analyze social network content and relationships. Tools and
analysis methods broadly include statistics, probability, graph theory, natural language processing,
and others.
The outline of this research is as follows: In chapter 2 I outline the overall problem space
of inferring reputation, explore the definitions of trust and reputation, summarize prior work in
the area of reputation, and discuss goals for this research. In chapter 3 I review many statistical,
graph, social network and natural language processing analysis tools and methods and discuss their
potential applications for inferring reputation. In chapter 4 I describe the data I obtain from the
Twitter6 social network and limitations therein, as well as many statistics on the data returned.
4 http://www.youtube.com
5 http://www.flickr.com
6 http://twitter.com
3Chapters 5 and 6 describe the implementation and analysis of the Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search
(HITS) algorithm and a new dynamic algorithm for determining influencers in the network during
an event, respectively. In chapter 7 I discuss conclusions and future work to be pursued.
Chapter 2
Influencers, Reputation, Validation, and Security
In this chapter I discuss the dependencies and layers of determining a user’s reputation in the
context of an event. Layers are not necessarily independent of each other; some methods employed
to solve a problem at one layer may also inform problems at another layer. We review research in
area of finding influencers in multiple social contexts and follow with a review of different definitions
of Trust and Reputation that will inform my research direction. We then discuss validation of a
user’s reputation as the third layer in answering the high-level research question described in the
introduction. Finally I discuss security implications of systems implemented to answer the research
questions.
Figure 2.1 shows the four layers of the problem with associated questions within each layer.
The layers are foundational, and must be approached from bottom-to-top, beginning with finding
influencers and moving on to determining reputation, validating that reputation, and dealing with
security implications of determining this information. These layers will now be described.
2.1 Influencers
Finding influencers in a network during an event is a first step in determining reputation.
Before we can look at reputation, We must first ask the question, “who is important in an online
social network during a specific event being discussed within that network?” Intuition leads us to
the fact that influential people are most likely the people who are interacting and communicating
in a network or social group and who are also being listened to by many others. Entire fields
5Figure 2.1: The four layers of the problem of determining a user’s reputation, including questions
for each layer. The layers are foundational and must be approached bottom-to-top.
6of study exist around dynamics of social groups and many have been studied in an attempt to
understand influencers. Some examples include adolescent smoking initiation by Arnett [3], moral
hypocrisy in power dynamics by Lammers et al. [70], centrality dynamics and delinquent influence
in game-theoretic networks by Ballester et al. [8] [9], interpersonal interactions in a research team
by Klemm et al. [66], interpersonal interactions in group discussion dynamics by Pan et al. [95],
and notably Wasserman and Faust [121] with various techniques. However, many of these studies
and techniques are centered around social dynamics governed by interaction in-person.
We want to understand how influencers emerge in online social networks where the social
dynamics are governed by the features of the particular online social network such as Facebook1 or
Twitter2 where the user interface has very specific behaviors that do not necessarily (and sometimes
intentionally) correspond to in-person interactions. Here I describe studies of online social networks
that attempt to look for influencers in these types of networks.
Ghosh and Lerman [41] analyze data collected from the Digg3 news network of 3553 news
stories in June 2009. They rank Digg users who posted a news story using many different ranking
measures to determine which ranking system best models the empirical data from the resulting top
Digg stories. The ranking models and algorithms user are closeness centrality, graph centrality,
betweenness centrality (discussed in section 3.7), PageRank/eigenvector centrality (discussed in
section 3.6), Hubbel’s model, in-degree centrality, α-centrality, normalized α-centrality, Katz score,
and SenderRank.
Gomez-Rodriguez et al. [44] analyze 170 million blog entries and news articles collected over
a 1-year period between September 1, 2008 through August 31, 2009. They attempt to infer the dif-
fusion network of how users are inter-connected by looking at how the information spreads through
the blogs and news websites during the year. They use natural language processing techniques and
use two network models (forest fire and kronecker) to determine the diffusion network.
Kitsak et al. [64] use k -shell decomposition (a variant of k -core decomposition described in
1 http://www.facebook.com
2 http://www.twitter.com
3 http://digg.com
7section 3.11) to determine influential actors in a network and apply the algorithm to LiveJournal4
communities, email contacts, contact network of inpatients in Swedish hospitals, and movie actor
co-star networks. They compare their results to results obtained from running the Susceptible-
Infectious-Recovered (SIR) and Susceptible-Infectious-Susceptible (SIS) epidemiology models on
the same data looking for those who have the most influence on the overall network. This method
does not look at any dynamics of the network and how it might change.
Ormerod and Glass [91] attempt to predict what songs will gain the most popularity in a
toy online music sharing network created by Salganik et al. [103]. Since the sharing data contains
temporal information about when songs were downloaded, Ormerod and Glass are able to look at
the dynamics of the network to predict what songs will become popular.
Some of the above studies look at the dynamic nature of the networks, and some do not. For
my needs, I specifically need to look at dynamic methods or ways that the static methods may be
applied to dynamic data to yield interesting results for finding influencers in the network during a
specific event. New events have initial actors and new actors may be added as the event evolves,
so the analysis methods must adapt to the changes in the underlying network. A number of other
methods techniques that operate on the type of data that exists in online social networks will be
described further in chapter 3 along with analysis of what data these methods may yield.
2.2 Trust and Reputation
Once I am able to determine the “who” of who’s influential in during an event, I then ask
the question, “why is a user influential in the context of an event?” As I attempt to answer this
question, I begin to search for the source of a user’s reputation within this context which is the
second layer of the overall problem. Building a reputation is a dynamic process that occurs over
time, and techniques to determine a user’s reputation must also be adaptive and dynamic. Here
I will describe the work in the area of reputation systems, investigate definitions of Trust and
Reputation, and discuss what information is available for determining reputation in order to refine
4 http://www.livejournal.com
8my research goals.
2.2.1 Definitions
Many attempts have been made by different researchers to define the very subjective notions
of Trust and Reputation. Vu et al. [120], Grabner-Kra¨uter et al. [47], and Jøsang et al. [59] each
survey different definitions of Trust and Reputation by people from varying disciplines including
Morton Deutsch (psychology), Niklas Luhmann (sociology), Diego Gambetta (sociology, economics)
and McKnight and Chervany (management, business) in order to make sense of the variable nature
of people’s perceptions of the concepts. Herzig et al. [50] offer a logic-based definition of Trust and
Reputation. We first look at reputation as it is defined for systems that have ratings that are made
explicitly, or actions that can be measured in discrete values to be considered as explicit ratings.
Vu et al. [120] provide a breakdown of trust types, values, properties and models. They
describe two trust types: trust in action, which is trust in the behavior of another agent, and trust
in recommendation, which incorporates the group aspect of social relationships. Trust values may
take on four different values: single, binary, multiple, or continuous. Single values are considered
complaints where a transaction goes badly and an agent sends a claim to the system but does
nothing upon a good transaction. Single value systems cannot differentiate between trusted and
unknown agents. Binary values do allow values for trust and non-trust and an agent can distin-
guish between unknown and trusted agents, but unknown agents are neither trusted or distrusted.
Multiple values allow an agent to specify varying levels of trust, such as “very untrustworthy”,
“somewhat untrustworthy”, “somewhat trustworthy”, and “very trustworthy”. Continuous values
are percentages of trust between 0 and 1.
Vu et al describe four properties of trust: autonomy, asymmetry, transitivity and compos-
ability. Autonomy as a property describes that trust depends on the perspective of the individual,
and two individuals may have very differing trust views on the same subject. Asymmetry is the
property where two individuals may not trust each other equally, depending on the context. In
some cases, trust may be only in a single direction. Transitivity is the property where trust is
9conferred to an individual who is not directly trusted, but is trusted by an individual who is directly
trusted. Trust transitivity is not perfect, and decays very quickly upon only a few transitive hops.
Composability is the property of trust that is necessary in order to combine multiple trust values
into a final conclusion. This property is not only limited to trust values stated by individuals, but
also includes attributes of the trustee. For example, if readers are asked to rate a news article on
how much they trust the article, extra information about the news agency (whether or not it is CNN
or Fox News) may affect the ratings. The extra attributes are composed into a final conclusion.
Two trust models described by Vu et al. include credential-based and reputation-based trust.
Credential-based trust relies on the authentication of an identity, which is used in many different
systems for user logins such as online banking and email accounts). Many enhancements to simple
username and password credentials have been proposed and studied, such as RSA keys, X.509
certificates, PGP keys, and others.
Reputation-based trust fills the gap where credentials are not enough to trust an individual
and past actions are considered as part of the process of verifying trust. Reputation has both
individual and social/group components. The individual component exists when an agent A only
has knowledge of its own transactions with agent B, and the social/group component exists when
agent A has knowledge of many if not all prior transactions of agent B. Figure 2.2 is a visualization
of the trust model taxonomy.
Vu et al. propose a definition of Trust based on the reputation-based trust model described
in the previous section: “Trust is the belief of an agent A about another agent B in the success
of a transaction as a function of agent B ’s reputation based on B ’s history (either individual or
social). If B ’s reputation is good, A trusts B. If B ’s reputation is bad, A should not trust B in the
transaction.”
2.2.2 Explicit Reputation Systems
Many systems currently exist to rate a user’s reputation in specific contexts. When I describe
explicit rating systems, I am speaking of systems that have well-defined trust attributes that can
10
Figure 2.2: A taxonomy of trust models, Vu et al. [120]
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take on multiple values and be composed into a meaningful overall reputation score as described in
section 2.2.1. As mentioned in the introduction, online commerce demands demonstrated the need
for systems that track user behavior. That need has been studied numerous times, with solutions
proposed to meet the need (either well or poorly) by a number of different systems. Below is
a non-exhaustive list of reviews or proposals of varying types of explicit reputation computation
models:
• Jøsang et al. [59] review definitions of trust and reputation, computation models (central
or distributed systems using averages, bayesian, fuzzy calculations, etc), and commercial
implementations of reputation systems such as Amazon, Epinions, Slashdot, Google PageR-
ank and others,
• Vu et al. [120] also review definitions, types, properties and values of trust as well as
survey multiple central and distributed computational reputation systems such as Regret,
NodeRanking, P2PRep, and others,
• Abdul-Rahman and Hailes [1] propose a model with discrete categories of very trustwor-
thy, trustworthy, untrustworthy, and very untrustworthy, using lookup tables to update
reputation scores,
• Sabater and Sierra [102] propose a model to be used in transactions using fuzzy rules to
obtain reputation scores, but do not attempt to detect malicious users,
• Guo and Kraines [48] also propose a model with discrete categories (high, moderate, low,
unknown, dishonest), making probabilistic assumptions of how correctly users will recom-
mend each other based on their rating, and calculate a transitive trust value for users with
no prior history,
• Carbo et al. [17] and Sherchan et al. [107] propose methods based on fuzzy logic models
for reasoning about user feedback,
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• Kuter and Golbeck [69] propose a model that performs a probabilistic logic sampling over
a Bayesian network to trust user recommendations only within high confidence intervals,
• Mislove et al. [80] propose a central token authentication system to combat spam from dif-
ferent sources (web, email, mislabeled content, and others) by leveraging trust relationships
and degree via social links,
• Kamvar et al. [61] propose a distributed model for managing reputation in peer-to-peer
networks, attempting to prevent malicious users from injecting false reputation values into
the network, and weighting long-lived users more strongly than newcomers, and
• Caverlee et al. [19] propose the SocialTrust framework which is an explicit feedback mech-
anism for communities within MySpace.
2.2.3 Implicit Rating Systems (Client)
The above explicit reputation systems do serve specific purposes, but in the context of many
online social networks or other information online, no means exist to explicitly rate people or
information using defined trust values that can be composed into a meaningful rating, so we must
look at implicit means of measuring and rating trust of people or information online.
Nichols [89] describes implicit data – data generated by users interacting with a system –
as usable for determining implicit ratings. He continues to state that implicit ratings overall have
less value than ratings generated from explicit systems (such as those mentioned in the previous
section), but that implicit ratings may be much more numerous. He describes many examples of
data that can be used for implicit ratings. Some of those examples are:
• Reference - User cites or refers to an item
• Saving - An item is favorited or saved for later use
• Examination - How long does a user look at an item
• Removal - What information is deleted or removed by a user
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Research into implicit rating systems typically involves monitoring users at their source
clients. Examples of monitoring users includes White et al. [125] who create a web search applica-
tion (utilizing existing search engines at the time) to group search results based on user interaction
with the search over time. They closely monitor how users interact with each search result and
re-order pages and modify summary snippets accordingly. Two more examples of client-side user
monitoring include Claypool et al. [26] who modify a web browser to monitor exactly how a user
traverses web links from search results to determine relevance of pages based based on how far links
are followed and Joachims et al. [58] combine an eye-tracking device to monitor how far down a
user reads a document and an HTTP proxy to monitor the time between page requests in order to
determine utility of web content to the user.
2.2.4 Implicit Rating Systems (Server)
The problem with applying implicit monitoring systems to social networks such as the ones
described in the previous section is we rarely have access to client-side information about what
links the user follows or how long a user remains reading a piece of information. Web server logs
are also not accessible, and as anonymous researchers we only have access to the public Application
Programming Interfaces (APIs) that have varying restrictions. As an example, the Twitter service
does have a public API5 which allows us to see only the final results of explicit actions taken by
users, such as posting a message or creating a social link with other users. This significant limitation
requires us to find tools or analysis methods that rely on observable user activity in social networks
to potentially infer reputation on a user or information generated by that user.
We describe varying methods in chapter 3 that may be employed to determine implicit ratings
of a user that may lead to eventual calculation of a reputation score. In chapter 4 I describe the
data available as well as limitations accessing that data from the Twitter social network used in
this research.
5 http://dev.twitter.com
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2.3 Validation
The third layer of the overall research problem of determining reputation of a user includes
validation of claims made by users about information or other users in the network. While this
is an important piece of the larger problem and arguably the most desirable for which to find a
solution, this thesis does not focus on this part of the overall research question. We will briefly
discuss the area of validation here.
The process of validating content is a very difficult one and typically left to humans for
processing of information. Data must be cross-correlated between sources to verify identities,
content, intent, and many other attributes. Humphreys et al. [53] perform a qualitative analysis of
how often users in the social network are releasing private information in their general tweet streams
and find that 12.1% of tweets have a location and 22.7% have proper names included in the text.
Further, Mendoza et al. [78] also qualitatively analyze tweets for intent and self-correction during
the Chile earthquakes in 2010. Additional qualitative studies of the network include Starbird et
al. [109] who analyze use of the Twitter service during the Red River floods in North Dakota and
Canada during the 2009 season and Palen et al. [92] who analyze use of the Facebook6 service
during the Virginia Tech shootings of 2007. While the information gained in each of these studies
is important, it is also very difficult for a computer to determine on its own.
In light of the need for human intervention or review, some larger organizations have been
created to facilitate human review of data of varying kinds. The concept is termed “crowdsourcing”
where a crowd of people is employed, usually as a call for volunteers, to analyze data. Examples
of systems that exist for crowdsourcing include Amazon’s Mechanical Turk7 and the disaster
visualization and coding system of Ushahidi.8 Mechanical Turk may be utilized to enabled
semantic coding of general data for its relevance and correctness for varying applications. Ushahidi
is more specialized for disaster events of varying kinds.
6 http://www.facebook.com
7 http://www.mturk.com
8 http://www.ushahidi.com
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For the purposes of validating the reasons discovered for why influencers are influential, I
foresee the need to have humans perform the validation of those reasons, or to dynamically inform
algorithms or processes created to find those influencers or reasons. And while computing systems
may be implemented to assist in narrowing the scope of the information reviewed by humans, but
the need will always exist to have people reviewing data. The groups of people may simply be
public health and safety officials or those similar to Ushahidi or Mechanical Turk.
2.4 Security
The final layer of the overall research problem lies in reporting of any of the data gained
from analysis from the previous three layers: finding influencers, understanding why those users
are influential, and validating those reasons. The question of security arises when reporting any of
that information publicly. Any information about users during a disaster event must be properly
scrubbed of information that may identify actors involved in the disaster that may introduce risk
of harm, whether that harm is physical, emotional, financial or otherwise. The problem enters the
area of anonymizing data with means that guarantee a reduction or elimination of those risks.
An example of the risk of publicly reporting data is demonstrated by the de-anonymization
research performed by Narayanan and Shmatikov [82] on the Netflix challenge dataset where a
significant percentage of the population (in some cases more than 80%) can be uniquely identified
in a supposedly “anonymized” dataset. Another example of potentially sensitive information that
may appear in the data could be information about the deaths of individuals such as those involved
in the Virginia Tech shootings of 2007. A study performed by Palen et al. [92] show that many
groups of people had names of the deceased and were posting that information publicly before
public health and safety officials had made any official announcement on the incident.
Another problem that arises when reporting any of the information gained in the data analysis
is gaming of the system. This is the problem of dealing with delinquent actors in a network who
are actively trying to subvert or break the system by injecting false or misleading information.
These actors could simply be curious individuals who would attempt to inflate the influencer score
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of themselves or another user, or as a worst-case scenario, multiple actors would be involved an
organized group of individuals performing a Sybil attack in order to misdirect the public or officials
from a terrorist attack by giving misleading information about a possible attack in a different
location than the one planned.
Research in the area of manipulation of networks and ranking systems includes Cheng and
Friedman [22] who study how the PageRank algorithm may be manipulated with Sybil attacks, Yu
et al. [128] who propose a technique for detecting nodes that are participating in a Sybil attack
to infiltrate the trust network of users in a social network, Puttaswamy et al. [98] who propose a
technique to protect user data in a network using k -anonymity, and Gayo-Avello [40] who analyze
how different ranking methods (PageRank, HITS, NodeRanking, TunkRank, TwitterRank) may
be manipulated by attackers.
While I do not go in depth in this area in the research in this thesis, these issues must be
very carefully considered when building systems and algorithms operating on public data that may
be public as they must be robust from attack.
2.5 Goals for Our Research
In this research I seek to answer the question described in section 2.1, “who is important in
an online social network during a specific event being discussed within that network?” In chapter
3 I will investigate numerous methods and tools that may assist in answering this question. The
subsequent layers of the problem as described in this chapter will be left for future work.
Chapter 3
Analysis Methods
In this chapter I broadly survey analysis methods and tools from many different science
disciplines such as biology, linguistics, computer science, physics, economics, and others. We begin
in section 3.1 by describing the different types of data I encounter in social networks and define
attributes I will investigate. Sections 3.2 through 3.5 describe a number of different statistics,
probability, and natural language processing methods used in social network data analysis. Sections
3.6 through 3.14 cover a number of graph-theoretic methods for determining community and user
influence based on the social graph. We conclude the chapter with a summary of the methods and
briefly mention other work not covered in the chapter. For most of the methods, I will provide the
following:
• A high-level description of what the method does,
• Prior work related to the method being described,
• A description of the algorithm,
• An analysis of the complexity and running time of the algorithm, and
• An analysis of how this method may be applied to inferring reputation of users or infor-
mation in social networks.
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3.1 Social Network Data
Before I am able to investigate the data online produced by people, I must first discuss the
motivations for choosing to investigate the analysis methods and tools described in this chapter.
General data analysis includes a vast set of tools, methods and algorithms, so I need to understand
the form and context of the data to be analyzed. In this section I discuss what data is available to
us from different online sources that may be used to infer reputation.
3.1.1 Online “Social” Data
Many services exist for the publication of information online by the average home internet
user. Aside from the long ago popular Bulletin Board Systems (BBS), one of the first methods for
publication was simple website hosting by providers in the mid-to-late 1990s such as the GeoCities1
service. Over the last eleven years, a number of new services have appeared and old services have
matured with larger feature sets. These services include rating sites (sites that allow people to
give feedback on products or people), forums (the evolution of bulletin board systems where people
are able to create discussions around a topic), news and blogs2 (places were news or opinions are
posted and people may leave comments), and wikis.3
As capabilities evolved, another feature began emerging in these services to allow users to
declare connections, or relationships, to one another. The common term social network is typically
reserved for online services that include this relationship feature in addition to the ability share
personal information, photos, videos or opinions about themselves or their experiences. Examples
of popular services that fall into the social network category include Facebook, Twitter, MySpace,4
and many others. Table 3.1 lists some examples of online services that fall into these different
categories. These divisions are not strict; some services such as Ning include many features that
span multiple categories. The category explored in this research is the social networks category
1 GeoCities was acquired by Yahoo in 1999 [27] but no longer exists as an available hosting service [111].
2 News and blog websites have a very similar feature set and therefore I group them together here.
3 Wikis are usually site-specific and are not open to public modification with only few major exceptions such as
http://wikipedia.org and http://wikibooks.org.
4 http://www.myspace.com
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(colored grey in the table) that includes the network graph connectivity information in addition to
other content shared among users in messages, photos, videos, and other media.
Table 3.1: Examples of online services
Ratings Forums/News/Blogs Social Networks
amazon.com slashdot.org twitter.com
epinions.com cnn.com facebook.com
netflixx.com wordpress.org myspace.com
bizrate.com blogspot.com linkedin.com
reviews.cnet.com thedailywtf.com flickr.com
hotornot.com ning.com ning.com
angieslist.com livejournal.com orkut.com
3.1.2 Social Network Data Attributes
In order to determine what available analysis methods and tools would be most applicable
for analyzing social network service data, I must understand the form of that data. The data for
social networks falls into three general categories:
(1) content - The content of the messages, profiles, pictures, videos, or any other type of
media shared between users,
(2) metadata - Extra data included with that content, and
(3) social graph connectivity - The declared relationship links between users.
Obviously the first two categories are common to all types of online services, but social
networks differ from most forums, blogs and rating websites by the existence of the declared social
graph. The content category is divided into four main types: text, pictures, audio, and video. The
metadata associated with each type varies wildly depending on the social network, but nevertheless
metadata exists. The social graph connectivity of the popular social network services is typically
binary, meaning a link exists or does not exist. Rarely are social graph links given weights to
represent different kinds of relationships (friend, acquaintance, business partner, etc). The social
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graph is also typically very visible by default for all to see. For the purposes of this research, I am
only interested in the text and metadata of messages and profiles as well as the social graph.
3.1.2.1 Message and Profile Text
Analyzing message and profile text falls under the domain of Natural Language Processing
(NLP), specifically in the area of Information Retrieval (IR). When this analysis is performed in
the context of reputation, I am interested in methods and tools that assist us in understanding the
following:
• Keyword/topic detection - Understanding what words co-occur among many users to
help determine both topic groups and other words to monitor.
• Phrase detection - Determining what phrases are being used among a group of users
• URLs - Knowing what websites are referenced among a group of users.
• Duplicates detection - For both detection of spam or bots as well as detection of when
information is forwarded between different users that is deemed interesting.
• User mentions - When users are mentioned by others in text, either in response to or
forwarding of existing information.
3.1.2.2 Message and Profile Metadata
Analyzing metadata becomes largely a problem of statistics and probability in terms of
counting, grouping, and predicting the likelihood of users having certain attributes or metadata
values. The metadata that is most important to us is the following:
• Timestamps - We want to know when messages were sent, profiles were created or modi-
fied, or relationships in the social graph were created.
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• Data source - In a number of social networks, the source interface (such as the website
or phone application) is available. This information reveals user behavior as he or she
interacts with the social network.
• Location - One of the most sought-after pieces of information is the physical location of a
user in a social network as they are interacting with the site, or revealing where they may
have been at the time posted photos or videos that were created.
• Language - Language settings may assist in determining other attributes of users in a
social network, and occasionally this information is available.
3.1.2.3 Social Graph
The availability of the social graph representing declared relationships allows us to apply
graph-theoretic methods and algorithms to determine a number of different attributes. Some of
those attributes I may wish to know are as follows:
• Community - Users automatically form or seek out online communities, but I want to be
able to detect the boundaries of those communities.
• Similarity - Combining similarity measures and the social graph may yield additional
information about users based on their association with people in the social graph and
what common interests or activities they may share.
• Influence/Rank - We want to understand who is the most influential in a network of
people during a specific event, and the social graph may be able to inform us of which users
have the farthest-reaching influence when sending messages.
• Connectivity - Other relationship patterns in the social graph may yield extra informa-
tion about the interaction between users, for example in the friend-of-a-friend motif5 in a
network.
5 One available tool for motif detection is FANMOD [124].
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3.1.2.4 Investigating Analysis Methods and Tools
Now that I have an understanding of the data attributes I want to discover or further un-
derstand within social networks, I am now able to investigate different analysis methods and tools
that may assist in determining the above information. If I am able to gain this information, I may
then begin analysis to determine whether or not the information may confer reputation on users or
information within social networks.
3.2 Similarity Measures
In this section I describe a number of different metrics used to determine similarity between
different sets of data. The methods described here are not exhaustive but are merely some of the
common methods used in different data analysis. We follow-up the descriptions of the methods
with a summary of how each may be applied in inferring reputation.
3.2.1 Jaccard Similarity
The Jaccard Similarity Coefficient (also known as the Jaccard Index) was developed by French
botany professor Paul Jaccard in 1901 [56]. The coefficient measures the similarity (or distance)
between two sets of data. The calculation is defined as the size of the intersection of the sets divided
by the size of the union of the sets as follows:
J(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B| (3.1)
3.2.1.1 Complexity
Given pre-created sets A and B of size m and n respectively, the time complexity of the
algorithm is O(m+ n) when using efficient data structures.
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3.2.2 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient measures the linearity between two variables. Values range
from -1 (perfect negative relationship) and +1 (perfect positive relationship), where 0 is no corre-
lation at all. N is size of the sample set of both variables.
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∑
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(3.2)
3.2.2.1 Complexity
The calculation occurs in O(n) time. All sums and squares can be calculated in one pass
followed with a calculation in constant time.
3.2.3 Assortative Mixing
Assortative mixing, proposed by Newman [85], is a property of networks where vertices in a
graph are connected to other vertices with the same or similar attributes of each other. To calculate
the assortative mixing value r, I define M as the number of edges, N is the number of vertices, and
j and k are the vertices at either end of an ith edge. The following calculation results in a value
ranging from −1 (perfectly disassortative) to +1 (perfectly assortative):
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(3.3)
3.2.3.1 Complexity
This calculation is run over all M edges in the network, and so runs in O(M) time.
3.2.4 Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient, also known as Spearman’s Rho, is also a measure
of linearity but after the variables are converted to rankings (starting at 1 for the smallest value
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of each variable and increasing from there). The measure essentially determines whether or not
the two variables have a monotonically increasing or decreasing relationship as the value of the
independent variable increases. N is the number of data points and xi, yi are the ranking values
for each variable.
ρ = 1− 6
∑
i (xi − yi)2
N3 −N (3.4)
3.2.4.1 Complexity
If one has values of variables that require conversion to ranking scores, a sorting method must
be used on both variables in order to set the appropriate ranking scores. A fast sorting routine such
as quicksort will on average require O(n log n) time which must be run twice. Once the ranking
scores are calculated, the correlation score requires O(n) time to sum the difference in ranking
scores.
3.2.5 Cosine Similarity
Cosine similarity is a measure of similarity between two vectors of size N by finding the cosine
angle between the vectors by calculating the dot product of the two vectors. Since the measure
computes the value for any pair of vectors of equal length, many different types of data can be
converted into vector form to be compared using this method. Given two vectors A and B of size
N :
cos(θ) =
A ·B
‖A‖‖B‖ (3.5)
3.2.5.1 Complexity
The time to compute a dot product is simply O(n) which makes this a very useful and
common similarity measure for large or multiple dataset comparisons.
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3.2.6 Euclidean Distance
Euclidean distance is commonly used to measure similarity among data points, but does
not necessarily have to represent real distance measures. The Pythagorean Theorem is used to
determine the distance between two points in n-dimensional space. Given two points p and q in
space with n dimensions, p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) and q = (q1, q2, ..., qn). We then calculate the length
of the line segment pq as follows:
d(p,q) =
√∑
i=1
(pi − qi)2 (3.6)
3.2.6.1 Complexity
The calculation of euclidean distance takes time O(n) where n is the dimension of the space
of the points. Typically n = 2 or n = 3 in most real-world applications, so this calculation can
be considered constant time. If S is the set of all points in a sample space, the time to calculate
distance between all points is O(‖S‖ log ‖S‖).
3.2.7 Normalized Mutual Information
The Normalized Mutual Information metric was first proposed by Fred and Jain [38] as a
means of comparing different clusterings of data with ground truth information to measure the
consistency between different data clusterings. Mislove et al. [81] apply the metric to a global
hierarchical clustering method (described in section 3.8) using profile data collected from Facebook.
Then the metric is calculated between the two clusterings to determine how well the cluster-
ings match. The value ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is no correlation between clusterings, and 1 is
an exact match between clusterings.
• x - A square matrix whose rows (typically) correspond to the ground truth data clustering,
and whose columns correspond to data clusterings from a second clustering method
• xij - The number of nodes in ground truth cluster i that appear in the detected cluster j
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• x.i - The sum over column i
• xi. - The sum over row i
• N - The number of vertices in the graph
−2∑i∑j xijlog( xijNxi.x.j )∑
i xi.log(
xi.
N ) +
∑
j x.jlog(
x.j
N )
(3.7)
3.2.7.1 Complexity
Since the double summation exists in the top of the fraction, the worst-case running time
of the algorithm is O(mn) where m and n are the number of attribute-based and algorithm-based
clusterings, respectively.
3.2.8 Naive Bayes Classifier
The Naive Bayes Classifier method is based on Bayes’ theorem named after Thomas Bayes,
an English mathematician in the 18th century who derived a special case of the theorem and was
published posthumously. The method works to describe posterior probabilities of events occurring,
given an existing set of evidence. Essentially, the method works to classify data into categories
based on the similarity different samples of data compared to a known set. Blei et al. [14] and
Ramage et al. use use Bayes Theorem in the Latent Dirichlet Allocation method to classify words
in documents to different topics. Sankaranarayanan et al. [104] use a naive Bayes classifier to
determine whether or not different Tweets in the Twitter service are considered “news” or “junk”.
To calculate a Bayesian probability, we have the following definitions:
• P (H) - The probability that our hypothesis H may occur.
• P (∼ H) - The value 1− P (H).
• P (E|H) - The conditional probability that the evidence will occur given the hypothesis has
occurred.
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• P (E| ∼ H) - The value 1− P (E|H).
The basic calculation for a Bayesian probability is as follows:
P (H|E) = P (E|H)× P (H)
P (E|H)× P (H) + P (E| ∼ H)× P (∼ H) (3.8)
The Naive Bayes Classifier then divides data as either matching or not matching based on
a specific probabilistic threshold. The threshold value must be tuned for each application and is
usually found empirically from tests.
3.2.8.1 Complexity
The complexity of the probability calculation is simply O(n) to obtain the necessary values
of P (H) and P (E|H), followed by a constant calculation.
3.2.9 Applying Similarity Measures to Reputation
Similarity measures are very flexible in how they may be applied to analyzing data. In the
context of social networks, similarity measures are mainly used to determine how well-clustered
users are in different ways. Some examples of the different ways these measures may be used are
determining the similarity between the sets of words used in messages in a group of users, the
similarity of attributes between users in a group, the frequency of postings, or the time of day of
postings. There are many arrangements of the data to be compared withs similarity measures in
this fashion.
Jaccard Similarity is useful for comparing sets of data without any need for ordering and
results in a value between 0 and 1 where 0 is no similarity between sets at all, and 1 is fully identical.
As an example, this method has been used by O’Connor et al. [90] for determining whether or not
a Tweet is actually a re-tweet of a prior Tweet using this simple “bag of words” approach where
spam is likewise grouped due to similarity.
Cosine Similarity is widely used in data analysis as a similarity measure due to its simplicity
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and fast calculation. It can be used to compare words in documents and normalize the comparison
between documents of different word counts as well as compare vectors of profile attributes. Some
examples include Narayanan and Shmatikov [82] who use cosine similarity in their popular analysis
of user profiles in the Netflixx dataset, Sankaranarayanan et al. [104] who determine topic clustering
of Tweets with cosine similarity, and Sayyadi et al. [105] use cosine similarity to cluster documents
around topics.
Euclidean Distance is commonly used as the similarity metric for data values that have
measurable delta values between each other. Obviously this metric is used when dealing with real-
world distance values, but other measurements that can be plotted in a coordinate plane may use
euclidean distance to determine similarity as well.
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient is a very common method for quickly determining
relationships between different variables in a data set. It has been used by Cha et al. [21] and
Tiovonen et al. [112] to measure in-degree and out-degree correlation of friends links in social
networks, by Ziegler and Lausen [129] to measure the similarity between recommendations of users
rating books on Amazon,6 and by Newman [85] who uses Pearson’s Correlation as the basis for the
measure of assortativity in social networks which is described in section 3.2.3.
Assortative Mixing is known as “homophily” or “positive preferential attachment”. New-
man states, “Patterns of friendship between individuals for example are strongly affected by the
language, race, and age of the individuals in question, among other things. If the people prefer
to associate with others who are like them, we say that the network shows assortative mixing or
assortative matching” [86]. Assortative mixing is based on Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient [85]
which is described above in section 3.2.2. Newman [86] studies assortative mixing in the context
of ages of marriage partners, racial mixing in heterosexual relationships, websites on the internet,
co-authorship networks, address books, software dependencies, and multiple biological networks
such as protein interactions, neural networks, food webs, and more. Chun et al. [23] study assorta-
tive mixing by vertex degree in the Cyworld social network in South Korea and Bagler and Sinha
6 http://www.amazon.com
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[5] apply assortative mixing to protein contact networks. Assortative mixing is also the basis of
the Girvan-Newman modularity measurement [42] for community detection which is described in
section 3.7.2.3.
Using assortative mixing we may find interesting patterns in the data of users for differ-
ent events. We may attempt to cluster users around different attributes or keywords and this
method could be used to determine whether or not a specific attribute clustering lends to positive
preferential attachment during that event.
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient can be used to compare different reputation
metrics to determine the efficacy of a new approach to determining reputation. If I find that an
analysis method is particularly good at determining location, I could use Spearman’s correlation
to see how well a second location method performs when compared to the first method. One issue
that Spearman’s ranking has is when the independent variable xi has two or more tied rankings,
the calculation is no longer valid. Two data points that have exactly the same values do not have
any linear correlation, so Pearson’s correlation coefficient described in section 3.2.2 must be used
and the tied rankings end up sharing an averaged ranking score.
Normalized Mutual Information is simply another way in which to compare clusterings
of data, and in this case will be very useful for comparing the many different graph clusterings that
are reviewed in this chapter. For example, we may use this measure to compare ground-truth data
of human-analyzed datasets to k -shell decomposition which is a variation of k -core decomposition
as described in section 3.11. This measure has been used in this way by Mislove et al. [81]
when comparing ground-truth clusterings of users in Facebook to the global hierarchical clustering
method as described in section 3.8.
A Naive Bayes Classifier may be applied to many different aspects of social networking
data. We may have a set of users who share an attribute, and may determine the probability of
whether or not a new user shares that attribute based on other data from user profiles. We may
also apply the Latent Dirichlet Allocation methods to determine groupings of users based on the
topics and keywords they share. These are only two examples of a great variety of applications for
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this specific measure.
3.3 Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency
Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF) is a very common method in infor-
mation retrieval systems for determining the importance of a word in a group of documents. The
Inverse Document Frequency (IDF) portion of the method was proposed by Spa¨rck Jones [108] as
a means to find words that are good discriminators between different documents. Intuitively, a
word that occurs in many documents should be given a lower weight than one which occurs in few
documents. When combined with Term Frequency (TF) which in the simplest manner is simply
the count of the words in a document, Robertson [100] describes TF-IDF as a measure which is
“proved extraordinarily robust and difficult to beat” for determining the importance of a word
among documents.
3.3.1 Related Work
Bilenko and White [13] use a variant of TF-IDF to determine relevant web pages based on
user search and browsing history based on query terms and how many times those query terms
appear in documents that users have visited. Costache et al. [29] use global TF-IDF scores to
personalize PageRank scorings for websites. Sankaranarayanan et al. [104] use TF-IDF scores
combined with Cosine similarity to determine whether or not to add a Tweet post to a clustering
of other news-related Tweets.
3.3.2 Algorithm
Robertson [100] presents equations and derivations of the measure. The probability of a term
ti occurring in a document d is given as the following where ni is the number of documents in which
ti occurs and N is the count of all documents:
P (ti occurs in d) =
ni
N
(3.9)
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Now the IDF is given as the following:
idf(ti) = − logP (ti) (3.10)
3.3.3 Complexity
The TF-IDF calculation requires a count of words and phrases in all documents considered,
which takes O(n) time where n is simply the total number of words in all documents. Any additional
documents can be added to the total without the need to recalculate the values from the beginning.
3.3.4 Applying TF-IDF to Reputation
The TF-IDF method works well with a large collection of documents that have a reasonable
length. One issue that arises with TF-IDF in the context of microblogged messages is that the
messages are very small (the average Tweet is 11 words long) and words very rarely repeat so the
term frequency is also essentially a count of the documents in which it occurs [90]. Further, new
words or misspellings can lead to a large TF-IDF score when they may not actually be important
[104].
However, this technique can still prove to be useful as one of the important issues in dealing
with social networking information is to determine when new events are occurring or what new
keywords are starting to be used. One could envision a new keyword initially having a large TF-IDF
score and over time this value drops as more people adopt the keyword or a larger phrase (n-gram)
and then the derivative of the TF-IDF score over time may become an important indicator of
adoption of a keyword or phrase.
3.4 N -Gram Analysis
The n-gram analysis method is a word counting technique in the natural language processing
field that computes the probability of a series of words occurring in a specific order. For example, I
would use n-gram analysis if I want to compute the probability of the word “nine” occurring after
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the series of words, “I went to bed at”. The size of the grouping of words is the value of the n
in n-gram, and 2 -grams are called bigrams and 3 -grams are called trigrams. The method offers
insight into a set of documents as to the common set of phrases that appear in the corpus.
3.4.1 Related Work
N -gram analysis is a very common Natural Language Processing method and is taught in
courses on the subject and appears in textbooks [60]. The usefulness of n-grams is demonstrated by
Google’s release of their 5 -gram (and fewer) corpus of phrases that appear at least 40 times among
all websites they crawl for the purposes of facilitating public research [45]. O’Connor et al. [90]
use unigram, bigram, and trigram analysis to determine common phrases in tweets in the Twitter
service. N -grams are also not limited to processing text, but has been applied to computing the
distance between protein sequences [55].
3.4.2 Algorithm
Here I will describe the process for computing unsmoothed n-grams for a corpus of text.
The process for computing the probability of a sequence of words of size n involves computing
the conditional probabilities of the preceding n− 1 number of words in the sequence. For bigrams
this means I only compute the probability of a word wn occurring based only the previous word
wn−1. Using the example in the introduction to this section, instead of computing the following
probability (which is read, “What is the probability of the word nine occurring given I went to bed
at?”):
P (nine|I went to bed at) (3.11)
We instead approximate the bigram using maximum likelihood estimation of bigrams from
a specific corpus of data normalized to their relative frequencies in the corpus, and then multiply
the relative frequencies together:
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P (nine|I went to bed at) = P (went|I)× P (to|went)× P (bed|to)×
P (at|bed)× P (nine|at) (3.12)
3.4.3 Complexity
The complexity of computing the phrase probabilities using n-grams is contained in counting
the n-grams in the corpus and simultaneously computing the relative frequencies of those n-grams.
The process of computing n-grams requires a single pass of O(w − n + 1) where w is the count
of all words in the corpus. Different n-gram sizes must be computed separately. The process of
computing the actual probability of a word given a phrase using bigrams is a constant calculation
with simple lookups to the computed relative frequencies.
3.4.4 Applying N -gram Analysis to Reputation
The majority of the data available in social networks is contained in text if I ignore the
other media types of pictures, audio and video. N -gram analysis offers the potential for culling out
useless information from bots or spammers, or from messages that are unrelated to the event being
considered at that moment for determining reputation. This analysis will lend insight into the
phrases that are popular among users during an event, and if combined with effective visualization
tools, will offer researchers a means of quickly detecting phrases that are becoming important over
the course of the event.
3.5 K -means Clustering
The k -means clustering method, formally introduced computationally by Lloyd [73], is a
method for automatically partitioning data into k different sets. The value of k is either pre-
determined or iteratively increased to determine clustering. The method is unsupervised and works
to cluster data around k points (called centroids).
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3.5.1 Related Work
The original idea was initially explored by MacQueen [75] in 1967 before Lloyd [73] offered a
euclidean-space based computation. The method is very commonly used in data mining techniques
with widely varying applications. The following are a small sample of applying k -means to infor-
mation available online: Huttenhower et al. compare their Nearest Neighbor Networks clustering
method (described in section 3.10) to k -means. Fred and Jain [38] combine k -means clustering
with normalized mutual information (described in section 3.2.7) yield more robust data clustering
across various data sets. Strehl et al. [110] evaluate k -means clustering among other methods in
the context of web page clustering.
3.5.2 Algorithm
In order for data to be clustered using the k -means algorithm, the data must first be converted
to comparable values (if it is not already in that form). For example, if one wants to look at
attributes of fruit, such as weight and type, one first has to convert the type (apples, oranges,
bananas, etc.) to numerical values. What values are used are not important, as long as the values
are uniquely represented in a set. Once the data is in a comparable form, the k -means method
operates in five major steps:
(1) Choose a value of k for the number of clusters to be discovered.
(2) Choose starting position of each of the k centroids. Note that the centroids may be chosen
specifically or randomly and that the starting positions may affect the final clusterings.
(3) Calculate the distances for each data point in the sample space to each centroid. This
calculation is done using the Pythagorean Theorem described in section 3.2.6.
(4) Group each data point according to its closest centroid. If the groupings have not changed
from the previous iteration, then stop.
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(5) With the current groupings of points to their nearest centroids, calculate the new values
of the k centroids based on the membership. This is done by calculating the average
coordinate among all data points in each group.
(6) Repeat from step 3 until finished.
3.5.3 Complexity
Step 3 requires O(kn) time to calculate the distance from k centroids to n points in space.
Each distance calculation requires constant time which is of order of the dimension of the sample
space. Depending on how the distances are sorted and stored, adding a data point to a grouping is
dependent on the data structure. If a max-heap is used for each data point for its distance values
to each centroid, grouping time is O(log k) for step 4. Step 5 requires O(n) time for computing new
centroids for all groups. Then I must iterate until centroids no longer change their values, which
may take I times. This leaves us with a worst-case running time of O(In2 log k). Many times the
convergence occurs much more quickly than worst-case.
3.5.4 Applying K-means Clustering to Reputation
The k -means algorithm is applicable in attempting to infer reputation, especially in the early
stages of data analysis. The method assists with understanding the basic patterns in the data which
I am able to apply to word and n-grams, profile or message metadata, and any available location
data. One of the problems with keyword search on social networks is that results may contain more
than one search term. One of the ways I would be able to use k-means clustering would be to group
users to keywords in search results in order to determine to which keyword users are closest, or
said differently, which keyword users are using the most in their messages. For other general data
analysis, I can compute clusterings of users based on varying profile attributes or friends.
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3.6 PageRank
The PageRank method, proposed by Larry Page and Sergey Brin [16], is one which calculates
the eigenvector centrality of pages which is the probability that a random surfer will follow a link
to a specific web page on the internet based on the number of links to that page, as well as the
number of links to parent pages as well. A page with very low in-degree may be linked from a
very highly ranked page, and therefore confers a high pagerank onto the low in-degree page. They
also account for the fact that a surfer may also randomly choose to go to a separate website and
not follow the links on the current page (known as the damping factor). The algorithm works
iteratively and converges relatively quickly to useful values.
3.6.1 Related Work
The PageRank algorithm is essentially a very large Markov chain as described by Ding et
al. [31] since a user following links on a page is independent of the previous page that user
visited. TunkRank, proposed by Tunkelang [113], is an implementation of PageRank on Twitter
relationships.7 The TwitterRank method developed by Weng et al. [123] uses a modified PageRank
in addition to topic modeling to find influential users on Twitter. Costache et al. [29] use a variant
of PageRank to personalize results based on individual and peer history. Gyo¨ngyi et al. [49] propose
the TrustRank algorithm which combines human-rated pages (spam or not spam) with PageRank
and transitive trust values to compute “good” and “bad” pages. Other investigations into the
efficacy and manipulability of PageRank include Bar-Yossef and Mashiach [10] who investigate
local approximations of PageRank, Cheng and Friedman [22] who look at how PageRank may
be manipulated using Sybil attacks, and Forsati and Meybodi [37] use learning automata with
PageRank to recommend pages to users based on their current browsing patterns. PageRank has
been extended in many other ways including dealing with different weights for outgoing page links
and working on undirected graphs. Ding et al. [31] and Hopcroft and Sheldon [51] also offer reviews
7 A web-based implementation of TunkRank is available at http://tunkrank.com
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of other extensions to the original PageRank algorithm.
3.6.2 Algorithm (PageRank)
Here I will describe the original algorithm from Brin and Page [16]. Given the structure of the
internet, I am able to represent the structure as a graph G = (V,E) where pages are considered the
vertices V and links to other pages are considered the edges E. We have the following definitions
for the algorithm:
• PR(p) - The rank value of page p ∈ V
• N - The number of total pages
• d - The damping factor
• IA - The set of pages that link to page A
• |Op| - The count of the set of all outgoing links of page p
The algorithm begins in an initial state where all pages have an initial probability of 1/N
and the damping factor is set to .85. We then are able to calculate the rank of a page A as follows:
PR(A) =
1− d
N
+ d
∑
p∈IA
PR(p)
|Op| (3.13)
The rank calculation occurs for each page in the graph, and is run iteratively until the values
converge. The higher the damping factor, the longer the values take to converge as the calculation
relies more on the link structure of the web instead of the random behavior of surfers [31].
The running time of the original algorithm is O(nD), where n is the number of pages being
considered and D is the average in-degree of all pages. The more common power method runs
in O(n) time and only requires 50-100 iterations [71]. The space requirements of the PageRank
algorithm requires the sparse adjacency matrix A which is implemented as an adjacency list, a
vector to store dangling leaf pages that to not have links to other pages, and a vector of size n
containing multiplication values for each iteration.
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3.6.3 Algorithm (TunkRank)
TunkRank, proposed by Tunkelang [113], is a computation analogous to PageRank to deter-
mine the influence of users in Twitter based on how those users are connected in the social graph
and how often users “re-tweet” messages. The intuition of this algorithm is that users who follow
few users are able to give more attention to the messages of the users that they follow, and therefore
confer a large ranking on those they follow.
The initial state of the influence rank of all users is 1/N where N is the number of users in
the network. The damping factor d from PageRank has been replaced by the “Re-Tweet” factor p.
To determine the influence of a user X, the following equation is evaluated:
Influence(X) =
∑
Y ∈Followers(X)
1 + p ∗ Influence(Y )
|Following(Y )| (3.14)
The calculation is done for all users and is performed a number of times until the values
begin to converge. The algorithm can be implemented with the same power method as described
in section 3.6.4 offering the same quick convergence.
3.6.4 Algorithm (TrustRank)
The TrustRank method proposed by Gyo¨ngyi et al. [49] is a supervised transitive trust model
combined with PageRank to do determine whether or not a web page is considered to be spam. The
algorithm is based on the assumption that “good” pages rarely link to “bad” pages and therefore
good pages transfer high trust values to downstream pages. A set of pages that are evaluated by
humans to be good or bad are stored in the oracle L. The algorithm occurs in five major steps:
(1) Calculate seed value s for each page in an initial set of pages using an inverse PageRank
score
(2) Order seed pages by their values from high to low
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(3) Invoke the oracle L on a limited set of high-value seed pages to generate a score distribution
vector d of all pages where good seed pages are set to 1 and all other pages are set to 0.
(4) Normalize the distribution vector d
(5) Iteratively calculate TrustRank scores from 1 to iteration limit M using a modified PageR-
ank computation
Since this algorithm uses the PageRank algorithm, the running time is similar although
slightly worse as the two versions of PageRank are run during the algorithm (one at step 1 and
another at step 5). Time is also required by humans to rate a set of pages as spam or good that are
then contained in the Oracle for lookups. The iteration limit M is simply the amount as described
previously in section which will typically be 50-100.
3.6.5 Applying PageRank and Related Algorithms to Reputation
PageRank works to impart a reputation-based ranking on a page which essentially is how
important the world believes a page to be by ’voting’ using links to the page. This same method
may be applied to social networks, but it has the major limitation of requiring “global knowledge”
of the network in order to confer appropriate ranking values. In the cases of social networks, only
the network provider (Twitter, Facebook, etc) has access to the entire network. Although public
access may be available to some of this information via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs),
a lot of time is required to collect the network data due to rate and authentication limits and not
all the data may be available. Locally approximating PageRank has been studied [10] but is NP-
hard which makes the measure infeasible for large graphs. Still, attempting to locally approximate
by potentially collecting enough of the graph around a set of users is worthwhile to investigate.
PageRank-related algorithms are popular versus other ranking methods due to the good speed and
storage efficiency of the algorithm [71], and if I am able to obtain the social network graph data,
these related algorithms plus potential variations on them may be useful.
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TunkRank would be the algorithm of choice for a PageRank variant if the entire social graph
is available. The intent of TunkRank is to find users who are ”influencers”, but influence is merely
a way of describing reputation. But again, this is a global method therefore inferring a global
reputation which isn’t a useful metric. With reputation being context-dependent, I would need a
way to deal with pruning out users that are not important to the context being considered. One
possible way to prune unimportant users may be to determine the activity network as described in
section 3.12.
TrustRank has an aspect of explicit trust systems as it relies on human rating feedback in
order to perform its calculation. However, the requirement of an oracle for only a limited set of
web pages makes the algorithm feasible for use in a larger system that is supervised by humans.
The process does require many interconnected pages in order to assign reasonable trust values to
individual pages, which could be a potential limitation due to access limitations of social graphs.
When applied to social networks, this method could be used to determine “good” or “bad” users who
are rated by the oracle based on the messages that they send to others around them. The algorithm
would then assign transitive trust values to users who are linked to by the seed set. Although
this situation may prove more difficult for humans as a user in a social network may have many
messages that need to be read and considered in the oracle scoring. However, human supervision
could potentially be augmented or replaced by smart natural language processing algorithms that
are able to determine a “good” user based on the automatically analyzed messages from a user.
3.6.5.1 Security Implications for Reputation
Caverlee et al. [19] investigate the effect of distributed collusion by multiple malicious users in
a social network that is ranked using both PageRank and TrustRank compared with their proposed
SocialTrust framework. SocialTrust is an explicit rating system that incorporates user feedback to
give weights to the relationship links in the social graph. They illustrate the significant issue of
ranking systems that contain multiple malicious users going undetected without the incorpora-
tion of user feedback into the scoring. They specifically compare SocialTrust with PageRank and
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TrustRank and demonstration that malicious users are able to establish themselves in trusting re-
lationships before misbehaving, and the PageRank and TrustRank methods (as well as TunkRank
since it is based on PageRank) will not be able to detect this malicious behavior. This issue is one
of the major issues when attempting to determine reputation of a user or piece of information in
these social networks.
3.7 Betweenness Centrality and Modularity
The Betweenness Centrality method, originally proposed by Girvan and Newman [42], is a
divisive8 community detection algorithm. The method eliminates edges that are the most “between”
communities, resulting in distinct, densely connected subgraphs. In subsequent work, Newman and
Girvan [88] add a calculation called “modularity” to measure the best-fit divisions of a graph into
communities using the Betweenness Centrality method.
3.7.1 Related Work
The Betweenness Centrality method is a modification of vertex betweenness centrality first
proposed by Freeman [39] for edges. The calculation of edge betweenness includes shortest-path
calculations in a graph, and two fast algorithms were developed independently by both Newman
[84] and Brandes [15]. The Brandes algorithm has been applied to publications of articles related to
genes by Wilkinson and Huberman [126] in order to determine networks of genes based on how key-
words are linked in the published articles. Everett and Borgotti [32] analyze how different clustering
techniques overlap including betweenness centrality. Pollner et al. [97] compare users who appear
in multiple k -cliques in the Clique Percolation Method (discussed in section 3.9) to betweenness
centrality and find a correlation between many k -clique membership and high vertex betweenness.
Radicchi et al. [99] compare a proposed local edge clustering coefficient community detection algo-
rithm with edge betweenness in both accuracy and complexity. Kitsak et al. [64] compare k -shell
8 “Divisive” algorithms begin with a fully-connected graph and then iteratively remove edges until all vertices are
disconnected.
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decomposition with betweenness centrality in terms of predicting the spread of information through
the network. Gloor et al. [43] use betweenness centrality to track the importance of a concept in
the web in news, blogs, and forums.
3.7.2 Algorithm
The full betweenness centrality method includes single-source shortest path, betweenness
centrality, and modularity calculations. We will describe each calculation here separately and
describe how all three interact to determine community divisions in a graph.
3.7.2.1 Single-Source Shortest Path
Newman [84] uses a modified depth-first search to calculate shortest paths from a single
vertex j as follows:
(1) Choose a vertex j and assign it distance zero, indicating it is zero steps away from itself,
and set distance d← 0.
(2) For each vertex k whose assigned distance is d, follow each attached edge to the vertex l
at its other end and, if l has not already been assigned a distance, and assign it distance
d+ 1 and also declare node k to be a predecessor of l.
(3) If l has already been assigned a distance equal to d+ 1, there is no need to set the distance
again, but k is still declared to be a predecessor of l, indicating more than one shortest
path to the original vertex j.
(4) Set d← d+ 1.
(5) Repeat from Step 2 until there are no unassigned nodes remaining.
3.7.2.2 Betweenness Centrality
Betweenness centrality for an edge eij from vertices vi and vj is a count of the number of
shortest paths from a single chosen source vertex j to all other vertices in the network that pass
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over edge eij . In order to calculate the betweenness value for each vertex in the network. The
process is as follows:
(1) A variable bk, taking the initial value 1, is assigned to each vertex k.
(2) Going through vertices k in order of their distances from j, starting from the farthest, the
value bk is added to the corresponding variable on the predecessor vertex of k. If k has
more than one predecessor, then bk is divided equally between them. This means that, if
there are two shortest paths between a pair of vertices, the nodes along those paths are
given a betweenness of 12 each.
(3) When I have gone through all vertices in this fashion, the resulting values of the variables
bk represent the number of geodesic paths to vertex j that run through each vertex in the
network, with end points of each path being counted as part of the path. To calculate
betweenness for all paths, the bk are added to a running score maintained for each vertex
and the entire calculation is repeated for each of the n possible values of j. The final
running scores are precisely the betweenness of each of the n vertices.
3.7.2.3 Modularity
Modularity is the key component to this enhanced algorithm to determine the “best fit” of
community divisions. The measure is based on “Assortative Mixing” proposed by Newman [86]
(described in section 3.2.3). The basic algorithm for calculating the modularity Q for a division of
a network (removal of an edge with the highest ”betweenness” value) is as follows:
(1) Choose a division of a network into k communities
(2) Create a k × k symmetric matrix e whose element eij is the fraction of all edges in the
network that link edges in community i to community j. Note that an edge linking commu-
nities i and j must be split, half-and-half, between the ij and ji elements of e to maintain
symmetry.
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(3) Calculate the trace of the matrix e, which is the fraction of all edges in the network that
connect to nodes within the same community:
Tre =
∑
i
eii (3.15)
(4) Calculate the row (or column) sums which represent the fraction of edges that connect to
nodes in community i:
ai =
∑
j
eij (3.16)
(5) Finally, calculate Q as the trace of the matrix e minus the square of the sum of the rows
(or columns) ai from above:
Q =
∑
i
(eii − a2i ) = Tr e − ‖ e2 ‖ (3.17)
As mentioned in [88], if the number of within-community edges is no better than random,
Q = 0. Values approaching Q = 1 indicate strong community, however typically values fall in the
range of 0.3 to 0.7.
3.7.2.4 Edge Betweenness and Modularity
All three of the above calculations work together in the following manner to determine com-
munities within a network:
(1) Calculate the betweenness for all edges in the network,
(2) Remove the edge with the highest betweenness value,
(3) Recalculate the betweenness for all edges affected by the removal, and
(4) Repeat from step 2 until no edges remain.
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3.7.3 Complexity
The Betweenness Centrality method is quite complex due to the multiple distinct calculations
for shortest path, edge betweenness, and modularity. The shortest path calculation requires O(m)
time where m is the number of edges in the network, the edge betweenness calculation requires
O(n) time where n is the number of vertices in the network, and the modularity measure requires
O(n) time to build the community adjacency matrix. To determine communities for the entire
graph until all vertices are fully disconnected, the running time is O(mn2).
3.7.4 Applying Betweenness Centrality and Modularity to Reputation
The Betweenness Centrality with Modularity measure yields very good community divisions
in any network that is of relatively small size. However, this is the major limitation of the method
since it does have a very bad running time of O(mn2). Newman and Girvan observe that this
algorithm is only feasible for networks of about 10,000 vertices at the time of writing in 2004 [88].
The trade-off is that the algorithm does perform well when determining community. Others have
also cited this limitation as a reason to avoid using the algorithm [28] [25] although Newman [87]
concludes that the algorithm yields the best results compared to other algorithms and should be
used where computationally feasible.
This method may still be useful for small collections or approximations of networks that
expand far enough out from the target group of users in a network to determine community. We
will summarize other community detection algorithms in sections 3.8 and 3.13 that use this method
as a basis with significant speed improvements.
3.8 Global Hierarchical Clustering
The Global Hierarchical Clustering method, proposed by Newman [87], is a graph community
detection method and differs from the Betweenness Centrality method described in section 3.7 in
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the fact that it is an agglomerative method.9 Newman developed the method to overcome the poor
performance of the divisive Betweenness Centrality algorithm. The method also uses a modularity
calculation in such a way to greedily maximize the modularity value when deciding which vertex to
agglomerate into a specific community. Said differently, the measure only agglomerates the vertex
that yields the largest increase (or smallest decrease) in the modularity. This method also requires
global knowledge of the graph as the algorithm depends on the interconnectivity of all nodes in the
network.
3.8.1 Related Work
The agglomerative method is a general one used in many applications, but has been applied
to football conference groupings, jazz musician collaborations, and co-authorship relationships by
Newman [87]. Clauset et al. [25] further improve the running time of the algorithm by Newman and
apply it to the Amazon purchasing network with over 400,000 vertices and over 2.4 million edges.
Mislove et al. [81] use this method to attempt to globally infer attributes of users in Facebook.
3.8.2 Algorithm
Here I describe the undirected graph algorithm from Clauset et al. [25]. The algorithm
improves on the one from Newman [87] in that it does not store the adjacency matrix, but instead
only stores the change in modularity between two communities, ∆Qij . The data structures required
for the algorithm are as follows:
• A sparse matrix of ∆Qij values for each pair i, j of communities that have at least one edge
between them. This matrix is represented as a balanced binary tree for fast queries and
insertions,
• A max-heap H containing the largest element of each row of the ∆Qij matrix, including
the labels i, j to identify the pair of communities, and
9 “Agglomerative” methods begin with a fully-disconnected graph and then iteratively add edges to re-connect
the vertices.
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• A vector array containing sum ai of each row of the adjacency matrix
3.8.2.1 Initial State
As with all agglomerative graph algorithms, each vertex begins as a sole member of a com-
munity. The value ki is the degree of community i (which is simply the degree of the single vertex
initially in community i) and m is the number of edges in the network. The initial ∆Qij matrix
and ai vector are set to the following:
∆Qij =

1
2m −
kikj
(2m)2
if i, j are connected,
0 otherwise.
(3.18)
ai =
ki
2m
(3.19)
The max-heap H is then initially populated with the largest element of each row of ∆Q.
3.8.2.2 Joining Communities
The algorithm then selects the largest ∆Qij value from H and joins the corresponding com-
munities. The ∆Q matrix is then updated with new values, but only the communities that also
touch communities i and j need to be updated. To join two communities i and j, the operation
is a merge into one of the two communities i or j, and the other community is removed from the
∆Q matrix. To merge communities i and j into a new community j, all communities that connect
to i and j must be updated with new ∆Q values. To update the matrix and aj values when a
community k is connected to one or both of the merging communities, the following calculations
are used:
∆Q′jk =

∆Qik + ∆Qjk if k is connected to both i and j,
∆Qik − 2ajak if k is connected to i but not j,
∆Qjk − 2aiak if k is connected to j but not i,
(3.20)
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a′j = ai + aj (3.21)
The selected ∆Qij value is then added to the global modularity value Q. The max-heap H
values must also be updated for each ∆Qij value that was affected by the merging of communities
i and j. This merge step is repeated for all communities until only one final community remains.
3.8.3 Complexity
Merging two communities i and j requires O((ki + kj) log n) time. Recalculating the values
for the max-heap H also requires O((ki + kj) log n) time. In the worst-case, the degree of a com-
munity i is the sum of the degrees of all vertices in the original network that comprise i, meaning
the community connects to many other communities. This means that in the dendrogram that
represents the network, the number of joins is depended on the depth d of the dendrogram as well
as the total degree of all vertices in the network which is 2m where m is the number of edges. This
means the running time is O(md log n).
3.8.4 Applying Global Hierarchical Clustering to Reputation
Much like the Edge Betweenness method described in section 3.7, this method requires full
knowledge of the network graph. One is able to run this algorithm on a subset of a network, but
there’s no way to determine if the modularity values will correspond to any meaningful division of
communities without all of the vertices and edges. For this reason, follow-up work for discovering
local communities lacking global knowledge of the network have been developed, and are described
in section 3.13. However, if I am able to obtain the full network topology, or at least a subset of
the network that spreads far enough from the vertices being considered, the speed of this algorithm
makes it an attractive candidate for determining communities in a network.
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3.9 Clique Percolation Method
The Clique Percolation Method (CPM), proposed by Dere´nyi et al. [30], is a community
detection algorithm with a distinct characteristic in that is allows a vertex in a network to belong
to multiple communities rather than limiting a vertex to only one community. In most real-world
networks, vertices (or more appropriately, people) may belong to multiple overlapping communities
with different characteristics that define each community.
3.9.1 Related Work
Dere´yi et al. [30] and Palla et al. [93] propose the clique percolation method for detection of
overlapping communities initially on undirected graphs. In subsequent work Farkas et al. extend
the method for weighted networks [34] and Palla et al. extend the method for directed networks
[94]. Implementations of all of the above variations of the algorithm are available online.10 The
algorithm was initially tested against Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) uncorrelated random graphs [30] [34], and
later applied to word associations [93] [94], protein networks [93], Google’s website structure [94],
paper co-authorships [93], correlation graphs of NYSE stocks [34], student email interactions [94],
and also to Twitter relationships [57].
3.9.2 Algorithm
Here I will describe the algorithm from the supplementary information of Palla et al. [93] for
undirected graphs. Before describing the operations, I must first define structures and relationships
for this method. These definitions are given in [30]:
• clique - A set of vertices that are fully-interconnected with one another.
• k-clique - A clique that contains k vertices.
• maximal clique or complete subgraph - The largest fully-interconnected subgraph from
a specific vertex in the graph
10 http://CFinder.org
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• maximum clique - The largest fully-interconnected subgraph of the entire graph. Note
that a graph may have one or more maximum cliques, and may have multiple, smaller
maximal cliques.
• k-clique adjacency - Two k -cliques are adjacent if they share k − 1 nodes. We see this
illustrated in the left portion of figure 3.1(a) where the highlighted black triangles share
two vertices (or one edge).
• k-clique chain - A subgraph which is the union of a sequence of adjacent k -cliques as
shown in the both portions of figure 3.1(a). The black highlighted clique in the right
portion demonstrates a large k -clique chain. Note that a k -clique chain is not the same as
a maximal clique.
• k-clique connectedness - Two k -cliques are connected if they belong to any part of the
same k-clique chain.
• k-clique percolation cluster - A maximal k -clique connected subgraph, i.e. the largest
k-clique chain discovered in the graph.
The CPM algorithm occurs in three high-level steps:
(1) Search the graph for all maximal cliques (as k -cliques are subgraphs of maximal cliques),
(2) Create an adjacency matrix of each of the discovered maximal cliques where the adjacency
value is the number of shared nodes between each clique, and
(3) Reduce the matrix to evaluate a specific value of k by removing each diagonal entry with
degree less than k and every off-diagonal entry with degree less than k − 1.
To locate the maximal cliques, one must exhaustively search through the graph one node
at a time looking for surrounding nodes that share the same neighbors as the node in question.
The search is a recursive one and consists of finding the intersection of the neighbors of nodes in
the current clique and adding a node in the intersection and continuing the search for subsequent
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(a) Two networks each with k -cliques of size k = 3. The left network has two small separated 3-clique percolation
clusters. The right network contains one giant 3-clique percolation cluster (in black) overlapping with one small
3-clique percolation cluster (grey).
(b) The k -clique overlap matrices for the networks in figure 3.1(a). k -clique chains are found by removing diagonal
elements of size less than k and off-diagonal elements of size less than k − 1.
Figure 3.1: Visualization of the clique percolation method
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neighbor intersections. Cliques may overlap, so once a maximal clique is discovered, one must back
up to a previously unconsidered node to continue the search. The clique adjacency matrix may
be created as each maximal clique is discovered by iterating through the matrix and counting the
overlapping nodes for each existing clique with the newly discovered clique.
3.9.3 Complexity
The first step of the CPM algorithm works to find all maximal cliques for a particular graph.
Finding a clique of a specific size k has been shown to be NP-Complete by Karp [62]. Further,
finding maximal cliques is also proven to be unapproximable by Zuckerman [130]. However, once
the maximal clique adjacency matrix is created, it is trivial to analyze different clique sizes as the k -
clique information for all sizes is contained in the matrix. Palla et al. offer a running time of under
2 hours to analyze the Arxiv11 co-authorship data for around 127,000 links using a commodity
desktop PC at the time of writing in 2005 of their supplemental information for [93].
3.9.4 Applying the Clique Percolation Method to Reputation
As mentioned previously, Java et al. [57] apply the undirected algorithm as described in this
section to Twitter relationships, and follow up with analyzing the top keywords that appear in the
different communities. This technique of performing statistical analysis to analyze the trends within
the community is one of assessing group reputation, and therefore the reputation of a user as it is
inherited from the group with which that user associates. As with all other community detection
methods, the statistical analysis may be applied to any attribute or combination of attributes
within the community to determine other information such as common language, location, and
many other details.
However, the CPM algorithm suffers the same issue as the Betweenness Centrality method
described in section 3.7 as the running time is too long to analyze large networks. The algorithm
will still be useful if the network is pruned to a sub-network to perform the analysis. The largest
11 http://arxiv.org
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benefit of CPM is the fact that users may belong to multiple k -cliques (communities) which allows
for a more accurate analysis of attribute data for users within a community compared to the other
agglomerative and divisive algorithms such as those described in sections 3.7, 3.8, and 3.13 that
completely segregate nodes into distinct, non-overlapping communities.
3.10 Nearest Neighbor Networks
The Nearest Neighbor Networks (NNN) method, proposed by Huttenhower et al. [54], is
a divisive graph algorithm which clusters genes into neighborhoods of genes where they are the
most similar and fully interconnected to each other (in k -cliques). This method differs from other
clustering methods in that it combines a similarity measure of a graph vertex (in this case genes)
in addition to network connectivity to determine communities.
3.10.1 Related Work
The NNN method is from the world of biology and genetics which employ many clustering
techniques to analyze different gene relationships. Huttenhower et al. compare their algorithm
to others that are typically used in the field including Aerie, CAST, CLICK, GenClust, Quality
Threshold Clustering, SAMBA, and k -means12 [54]. In their analysis, Huttenhower et al. use
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (as described in section 3.2.2) as well as euclidian distance for the
similarity measure calculation.
3.10.2 Algorithm
Here I describe the algorithm by Huttenhower et al. [54] written in the context of social
network analysis. The algorithm works on a graph G = (V,E) with the following elements:
• d(vi, vj) - A similarity measure which returns the similarity value of two vertices vi and vj ,
• g - The size of k -cliques13 to be found, and
12 K -means clustering is described in section 3.5.
13 For a description of k -cliques, review section 3.9.2.
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• n - The size of the neighborhood for a vertex.
The algorithm then occurs in five major steps:
(1) Calculate the similarity measure of a vertex and all its neighbors and remove all links except
for the top-n nearest (most similar) neighbors,
(2) Remove all links from the graph that are not bi-directional (and remove all nodes that no
longer have any links),
(3) Find all of the k -cliques of size g in the undirected graph
(4) Overlapping k -cliques are merged (defined as k-clique chains in section 3.9.2) to produce
initial networks, and
(5) Initial networks containing cut-vertices (vertices that are shared between overlapping k -
clique chains) are split into final networks with the cut-vertices occupying both networks.
3.10.3 Complexity
As mentioned in section 3.9.3, finding cliques in a graph is either NP-Complete or unapprox-
imable. Huttenhower et al. mention that their algorithm runs with a lower-bound of 2.5 minutes
(with values of g = 3 and n = 10) and an upper-bound of 11.5 minutes (with values of g = 5 and
n = 40) on a single-threaded 2GHz machine processing their largest data set of 6153 genes across
300 genetic conditions at the time of writing in 2007 [54].
3.10.4 Applying Nearest Neighbor Networks to Reputation
This method has many features which are of interest when analyzing social networks. First,
this method combines a similarity measure with network connectivity which gives us the freedom to
define ”similarity” for my analysis. Since a vertex is a user with a profile and a history of messages,
I can define similarity as profile attributes or topics about which people are discussing. Second,
this method specifically allows a single vertex (or user) to belong to multiple communities, unlike
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many other methods such as Betweenness Centrality (described in section 3.7), Global Hierarchical
Clustering (described in section 3.8) and Local Hierarchical Clustering (described in section 3.13)
which only allow a vertex to belong to one community.
However, even given the benefits of the algorithm, it also suffers the same issue as the Clique
Percolation Method (described in section 3.9) as it uses k -cliques for discovering communities which
is very slow for small graphs and practically intractable for large graphs. Again, I would need to
approximate a smaller portion of the social network being analyzed to be able to use this method.
3.11 K -core Decomposition
The k -core decomposition method, proposed by Seidman [106], is a clustering method which
ranks vertices based on how closely they are connected to the core of the network. A k-core
subgraph of a larger graph G contains the set of vertices that have at least degree k after all other
vertices with degree less than k − 1 have been recursively removed from the graph G.
3.11.1 Related Work
Batagelj and Zavers˘nik [11] propose a fast algorithm for computing the k -cores of a graph.
Chun et al. [23] calculate the k -cores of the collected graph of the Cyworld social network in
South Korea to observe how strongly connected are people of similar degree. Alvarez-Hamelin et
al. [2] analyze Internet autonomous system (AS) cross-connectivity data from the skitter project at
CAIDA and the Distributed Internet Measurements and Simulations (DIMES) project using k -core
compared to the edge betweenness method (discussed in section 3.7). Carmi et al. [18] modify the
k -core decomposition to create k-shells which are groupings of multiple k -cores to determine the
functional roles of the autonomous systems from the DIMES data set. Kitsak et al. [64] compare
k -shell decomposition with the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) epidemiological model [63]
as a means to reasonably determine the influence a specific vertex has in a network and applies the
algorithm to the LiveJournal.com community, a network of email contacts, the contact network of
inpatients (CNI) from hospitals in Sweden, and the actor network from the Internet Movie Database
56
(IMDB).
3.11.2 Algorithm
Here I will describe at a high-level the algorithm from Batagelj and Zavers˘nik, and the full
description can be found in [11]. Algorithm 1 describes the process for computing the cores of a
network.
Algorithm 1 O(m) cores decomposition of networks [11]
Given a graph G = (V,E) as a list of neighbors
Map core = {}
Compute the degree d for each vertex v ∈ V
Order set of vertices V in increasing order of their degrees
for each v ∈ V in order, do
core[v] = d(v)
for u ∈ Neighbors(v) do
if d(u) > d(v) then
d(u) = d(u)− 1
Reorder vertices V
end if
end for
end for
Figure 3.2 is a visualization of an example network that is split into three k -cores. Note that
the vertices marked with an x both have degree k = 8 but belong to different k -cores. This is
due to the fact that as vertices with degree of k = 1 are removed from the graph, the x-labeled
vertex at the top-right only has a single connection (degree k = 1) to the core of the network, and
therefore belongs to k-core k = 1. Other interesting vertices are denoted with a pound (#) which
are vertices that also have a degree greater than 1, but belong to the k -core k = 1 due to their
neighbors being removed and leaving them with only one connection to other k -cores.
3.11.3 Complexity
The running time of the Batagelj and Zavers˘nik algorithm in [11] is O(m) which is the number
of edges in the graph due to time to sort the vertices by their degrees. The storage requirements
of the algorithm are steep as two arrays of size n must be kept, as well as an array of the starting
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Figure 3.2: An illustration of the k-cores decomposition of a network [64]. Note that vertices
marked with # have the same degree k = 8 but are not in the same core. Further, vertices marked
with x have degree k > 1 but are still considered to be in core k = 1.
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position of each vertex of increasing degree. If this algorithm is run on a large graph, a significant
amount memory is required.
3.11.4 Applying K-Core Decomposition to Reputation
The speed of this algorithm makes it very appealing for social graph analysis. As previously
mentioned, Kitsak et al. [64] compare k -shell decomposition (a variant of k -cores) to the SIR
epidemiological model and argue that k -cores are a good means to determine the influence a user
has in the network. More specifically, k -cores are a good measure of how likely a piece of information
spread by a user in a high-value k -core will reach all other users in the network. This measure will
be very useful when identifying who is at the center of a group during an event.
Further, Batagelj and Zavers˘nik [11] mention that this technique may be used to prune
vertices from consideration when attempting to find k -cliques of a specific size. For example, if a
vertex belongs to a k -core of size 4, it may never be a part of a k -clique of size 5. This heuristic may
speed up the running time of finding cliques as used by the Clique Percolation Method (described
in section 3.9) and the Nearest Neighbor Networks method (described in section 3.10).
3.12 Activity Network
The Activity Network14 method is a clustering technique that prunes edges from a social
graph based on user interactions with one another. The result is a subgraph (usually very weakly
connected and disjoint) that represents only those relationships that involve some sort of direction
activity between users.
3.12.1 Related Work
The idea of the Activity Network has been proposed in multiple ways. Huberman et al. [52]
create a directed activity network of users in the Twitter service by considering a user A to be a
“friend” of user B by user B sending at least two directed messages to user A. Wilson et al. [127]
14 An alternate name proposed by Wilson et al. [127] is interaction graph, but is functionally equivalent.
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combine an activity rate as well as the number of directed messages between two users (both with
varying values) to create an undirected activity network of users in the Facebook service. Chun et
al. [23] analyze the Cyworld service and create an activity network using weighted vertices where
weights are calculated as the sum of all outgoing messages to other users. Unlike the work by
Huberman et al. and Wilson et al., this analysis does not involve determining which users are
friends by interaction, but instead uses the weights to do general analysis on the overall network.
3.12.2 Algorithm
Here I will describe the process for all three of the methods mentioned above. The first I will
describe is from Huberman et al. [52]. They create the activity network based on messages sent
directly from one user to another. However, the Twitter service did not originally have support for
directed messages, so users began messages with what is known as a mention15 among Twitter
users. These mentions are placed at the beginning of a message and denote a directed message to
another user, although every follower of the broadcaster is still able to see the message. Huberman
et al. simply prune all of the “friend” or “follower” links of users that do not have at least two
directed messages to one another.
Wilson et al. [127] perform a similar pruning of links as Huberman et al., however there
are two important differences. First, Facebook relationships are undirected, so two users are only
considered to be “friends” in the activity network if they both send at least one message to each
other. Twitter relationships are directed, meaning they do not have to be reciprocated. Second,
an interaction rate is added to the pruning of links. Two parameters n and t are considered which
are the minimum number of interactions and a window of time, respectively. With both metrics, a
link is in the activity network is only retained if both users have sent at least one message to each
other and have done so within a specific window of time.
The creation of the activity network by Chun et al. [23] is based on weighting each vertex in
the social graph by their “strength”. The strength is the count the number of outgoing messages
15 A mention is when a username is placed in a message prepended by the “@” symbol.
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to declared friends in the social graph. Once node strength is determined, links may be pruned at
different thresholds to create a subgraph of users who use the network with a specific frequency.
3.12.3 Complexity
The method proposed by Huberman et al. requires three major steps: downloading of the
social graph, downloading of the tweets by each user in the graph, and parsing of each tweet for
those that begin with the mention format. If I disregard the time needed to collect the data from
Twitter, the process of pruning edges requires O(n) time where n is the total number of tweets
downloaded.
The method proposed by Wilson et al. also requires collection of the posts from Facebook
before analysis is possible.16 If I also ignore the time needed to collect the information, determining
the interaction rate can be done in the same pass as determining messages between users which
only takes O(n) time.
The method proposed by Chun et al. simply counts the number of messages sent by users in
the network. This process, like the other two, simply requires a single pass through all messages
by users which requires O(n) time.
3.12.4 Applying Activity Networks to Reputation
The activity network is the basis of potential reputation between users. Since I am using
implicit means of inferring reputation, user actions that directly involve other users, I may have
an indicator that the user who sends the message demonstrates the importance of the target user.
During a specific event, one way to determine clusterings of users will be to observe the messages
sent between users. This method may be modified an extended in a number of ways, including
using all mentions in the Twitter service (not just mentions that begin the messages) to determine
which users are becoming important to that event.
16 The data analyzed by Wilson et al. in [127] was collected by accessing regional networks which no longer exist
in Facebook [33].
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3.13 Local Hierarchical Clustering
The Local Hierarchical Clustering method, proposed by Clauset [24], is a graph community
detection method. Clauset describes the major limitation of other community detection algorithms,
which is the requirement of having global knowledge of the network structure in order to detect
communities. This requirement is impractical when analyzing networks where the full structure
cannot be known (such as the web), networks that may be too large for even the fastest agglom-
erative algorithms, or networks that require a lot of time to collect data (due to bandwidth or
API limitations). The method includes a local modularity calculation in order to determine good
clusterings without the need for global knowledge of the network. The method attempts to detect
communities from the perspective of a single vertex in the entire network, radiating outward, and
is in the class of “agglomerative” algorithms (such as Global Hierarchical Clustering described in
section 3.8) as it adds vertices and edges to a graph to determine community structure rather than
removing vertices or edges. The local nature of this algorithm implies the detection of concentric
communities, or communities that are subsets of larger and larger single encompassing communities
as the network is explored.
3.13.1 Related Work
Other researchers have investigated means of detecting local community structure to overcome
the global knowledge requirements as previously described. Luo et al. [74] attempt to search a
graph for a local module by both adding and removing vertices to maximize internal links over
external links. Clauset [24] uses a similar modularity metric as Luo, but does not remove vertices
to maximize the modularity value. Bagrow and Bollt [7] use a breadth-first search method to
expand a community shell outward until ratio of in-degree vs. out-degree has reached a user-
defined threshold. Mislove et al. [81] propose a metric called Normalized Conductance, which is
almost identical to the local modularity measure proposed by Clauset in [24] but differs only in
that the Normalized Conductance value is weighted against a random graph.
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3.13.2 Algorithm (Clauset)
Clauset [24] proposes an algorithm that attempts to minimize arbitrary expansion by visiting
local neighbors that have the lowest degree, thus helping to find the best local community before
moving outward to other unvisited nodes. The algorithm includes a “local” modularity calculation
similar to that of the modularity metric Q from the Global Hierarchical Clustering method (de-
scribed in section 3.8) as it is a measure of how optimal a particular division is when segregating
nodes into communities. The main difference is Clauset’s modularity calculation only depends on
the immediate neghbors of known vertices instead of the entire graph.
3.13.2.1 Local Communities and Neighborhoods
The algorithm assumes that I have a set of known vertices C of which I have perfect knowledge
in the graph G. The implication is there exists a set of vertices U about which I only know are
adjacent to vertices in C. Clauset further subdivides the vertices in community C to the following
groups, which are all illustrated in figure 3.3:
• The boundary vertices B which are the vertices that are connected to both the known
vertices in C and the unknown portion of the network U , and
• The internally connected vertices C that are fully connected only within the known group
of vertices (vertices that do not have neighbors in the unknown portion U)
3.13.2.2 Local Modularity
The existence of boundary B of the community as described above allows us to calculate a
”sharpness” of the boundary of the known community C. The idea is that a ”sharp” boundary will
have few connections from the neighborhood B to the unknown portion U of the network. The
adjacency matrix for the boundary B is given as the following:
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Figure 3.3: An illustration of the groupings of a network into the local community C, its boundary
B, and the edges which connect B to the unknown neighbors U [24].
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Bij =

1 if nodes i and j are connected, and either node is in B
0 otherwise.
(3.22)
The local modularity value R is now defined to be the following:
R =
∑
ij Bijδ(i, j)∑
ij Bij
=
I
T
(3.23)
The above function δ(i, j) is 1 when either vi ∈ B and vj ∈ C or vice versa, and is 0 otherwise.
Said differently, δ(i, j) is 1 when an edge in the network crosses the boundary of B into U . Here
T is the number of edges with one or more endpoints in B, while I is the number of edges with
neither endpoint in U (the edges that are fully contained in C).
3.13.2.3 Exploring the Unknown Nodes in U
The only way in which I gain additional knowledge of the graph G is by visiting a neighboring
vertex vi ∈ U , which yields a list of adjacencies. Since I only want to add vertices that give the
largest increase (or smallest decrease) in the modularity R, I will need to calculate the change in
modularity, ∆R, for a vertex vi ∈ U . The computation for ∆R is derived from equation 3.23 is
given as the following:
∆Rj =
x−Ry − z(1−R)
T − z + y (3.24)
Once a vertex vi yielding the largest increase or smallest decrease in R is discovered, vi is
added a member of C and additional unknown adjacent vertices of vi may be added to U . The
pseudo-code for the algorithm is described in algorithm 2. Figure 3.4 also shows the modularity
values for the Amazon recommender network for two books and a music CD.
3.13.3 Complexity
Each calculation of ∆R requires iterating through all nodes in the unknown portion U of
the network. If I choose a maximum size k for community C with an average degree of d, then
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Algorithm 2 Local Hierarchical Clustering (Clauset [24])
add v0 to C
add all neighbors of v0 to U
set B = v0
while |C| < k do
for each vj ∈ U do
compute ∆Rj
end for
find vj such that ∆Rj is maximum
add that vj to C
add all new neighbors of that vj to U
update R and B
end while
Figure 3.4: Local modularity R for three items in the Amazon recommender network, shown on log-
linear axes. For comparison, the time series for a random graph with the same degree distribution
is shown. The large open symbols indicate the locations of the five strongest enclosing communities
[24].
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the calculation of ∆R is roughly O(kd) if the network data exists locally through prior collection.
Therefore the overall running time for the algorithm for all nodes in the network in general is
O(k2d) or O(k2) for a sparse network. However, as observed by Clauset, for networks that exist
on the web, the running time is dominated by time to retrieve the data from the online source,
resulting in a linear running time of O(k). The value of k is not the entire size of the network, but
only that portion of the network that is considered when detecting a community.
3.13.4 Applying Local Modularity to Reputation
As a community detection algorithm that performs with limited knowledge of the overall
network, local modularity clustering is well-suited for use when operating under constraints for
data collection from a social network. As previously mentioned, the running time O(k2d) is bound
by the number of vertices that are evaluated for community division for the subgraph that has
previously been collected. Thus I am able to control how long the algorithm runs and still obtain
useful output.
However, one major limitation of the local method for hierarchical clustering is that I cannot
infer any local information for users that are discovered in super-set communities far from the
originating vertex. This implies that determining the immediate local community for an arbitrary
user will require a separate run of this algorithm for that user. However, users of interest determined
from other methods may be used to seed the collection for this algorithm, which subsequently could
be used to see whether or not the users of interest belong to the same or neighboring communities
in the network graph.
3.14 Hyperlink-Induced Topic Search (HITS)
The hyperlink-induced topic search (HITS) algorithm, proposed by Kleinberg [65], was de-
veloped to solve the problem of many early web search engines where “relevant” sites were ranked
simply by the frequency of the specific keyword on which the search was performed. As the amount
of websites grew (and still grow today), the number of search results have also increased to the
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point where there are too many results for the human reader to consume. Further, many websites
began injecting multiple keywords in their HTML documents in order to inflate their rank in these
original search engines and appear high on the search result list.
The HITS algorithm improves the search results for these search engines by also considering
the link structure of the websites returned by these search engines. The goal is to determine the
set of pages that are the ”authorities” (the most relevant pages) for the keyword, as well as the
pages that are “hubs” (the pages that link to many related “authorities”).
3.14.1 Related Work
Kleinberg [65] first proposed the HITS algorithm and modifications to the algorithm were
developed by Bharat and Henzinger [12] to solve the problem of “mutually reinforcing relationships
between hosts” (one page on site A links to many pages on site B, or many pages on site A link to
one page on site B) and the problem of “topic drift” (highly-ranked authorities and hubs are not
about the original search query). Further improvements on the Bharat and Henzinger algorithm
were developed by Li et al. [72] and Asano et al. [4]. HITS and its improvements have been applied
many times to the web link structure, but has also been applied to social networks to determine the
“authorities” within the users of the Twitter social network by Java et al. [57] (although without
any keyword search context for the users). Romero et al. [101] apply the HITS algorithm to predict
the popularity of links shared and re-tweeted in the Twitter social network.
3.14.2 Algorithm
Here I will describe the original algorithm by Kleinberg in [65]. The algorithm fundamen-
tally solves for the principle eigenvector of two matrices using the power method after initial data
collection. The algorithm occurs in three major steps:
• Construct a focused subgraph - Collect the t highest-ranked pages (typically t = 200)
for a query σ from an existing web search engine. This set of pages is the root set Rσ.
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• Expand the root set of search results - The expanded base set Sσ is created by adding
any page pointed to by a page in Rσ and any page that points to a page in Rσ. Note: a
restriction is that a single page in Rσ is only allowed to bring in at most d pages pointing
to it (typically d = 50) into Sσ. Algorithm 3 describes the process for this step.
• Iteratively compute hub and authority values - For each page p ∈ Sσ, compute the
hub and authority values k times (typically k = 20) until the values converge. Algorithm
4 describes the process for this step.
Algorithm 3 HITS Base Set Collection from Kleinberg [65]
Given the following:
Search results Rσ
In-degree limit d
Set Sσ := {}
for each page p ∈ Rσ do
Let Γ+(p) denote the set of all pages p points to.
Let Γ−(p) denote the set of all pages pointing to p.
Add all pages Γ+(p) to Sσ.
if |Γ−(p)| ≤ d then
Add all pages in Γ−(p) to Sσ
else
Add an arbitrary set of d pages from Γ−(p) to Sσ
end if
end for
Return Sσ
3.14.3 Complexity
The first step of the algorithm requires data collection from a separate source (in the case of
the original algorithm, the data were web pages). The time complexity for this step is bound by
the time to collect the data from the web. The space complexity for this step is simply the storage
of each web page as an identifier, as well as the list of links on the page itself. Due to the variable
nature of web pages, the storage needs may only be guessed initially.
The second step of the algorithm requires querying the search engine used to find the initial
root set to obtain the list of pages that point to all the pages in the root set Rσ. Further, another
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Algorithm 4 HITS Hub and Authority Computation from Kleinberg [65]
Given the following:
Base set Sσ of n pages
Iteration limit k
Let vector z = (10, 11, ..., 1n−1).
Set initial authority values vector a := z.
Set initial hub values vector h := z.
for i = 1, 2, ..., k do
for each page p ∈ Sσ do
Calculate authority score as follows:
for each page p′ that points to p do
Set ap =
∑
p′ hp′
end for
Calculate hub score as follows:
for each page p′ which is pointed to by p do
Set hp =
∑
p′ ap′
end for
end for
Normalize a and h values so that
∑
j a
2
j =
∑
j h
2
j = 1.
end for
Return (a, h).
70
query must be made to collect all the pages to which the root set Rσ point. This can be done by
either querying the search engine or following the outgoing links that exist in the pages in the root
set.
The third step of the algorithm iterates through the links to and from each page in the base
set Sσ and calculates hub and authority values, which means the running time for this step is O(nd)
where n is the number of pages in the base set Sσ and d is the average total degree (in and out)
of all pages in the result set Sσ. The hub and authority values are then normalized for all pages
which results in a running time of O(n) for both values. Finally, this step iterates k times through
the pages, so the overall average case running time for the algorithm is O(knd).
3.14.4 Applying HITS to Reputation
The hubs and authorities calculation of HITS for web pages is a direct calculation of eigen-
vector centrality based on how neighbors link to the page in question, or how the page in question
links out to neighbors in order to determine the importance of a single page relative to all other
pages in the base set Sσ. However, when considering applying the algorithm to a social network,
the situation is not directly analogous. First, the algorithm attempts to remove intrinsic links from
web pages that point to themselves in order to prevent accidental inflation of a hub or authority
score. If I consider the explicit link graph (the ”friends” links) in online social networks, users
are not allowed to make links to themselves, and are only allowed to make a single connection to
another user, which negates the need to worry about intrinsic links or multiple transverse links.
This eases the work done by the algorithm by skipping this pruning process in the second step of
the algorithm where the root set Rσ is expanded to the base set Sσ. Second, the original HITS
algorithm relies on an existing search engine which only exists in limited form from specific social
networks, an example being Twitter. As mentioned previously, Java et al. [57] applies the HITS
algorithm to Twitter, but does not mention any use of keyword search to obtain the seed set of
users to begin the hubs and authorities calculation.
The Twitter service, for example, does allow keyword search on the service via an application
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programming interface (API), but the results are returned in no particular order as a sampling of
the overall posts that contain the keyword in question. Therefore any hub or authority calculation
for search results may produce very disjoint hubs and authorities that are not related to the keyword
in any way. Instead, this method may be more applicable to determine the influencers within a
particular community or within multiple communities.
Another property of the algorithm is that all pages which are computed to be of high impor-
tant are assumed to be all related to each other. However, social networks differ from web pages
considerably in this regard where as web pages typically only speak to specific topics, users in a
social network have very diverse interests and connections to others that equates to having many
topics belonging to a single user. This is an important distinction when analyzing nodes in a social
network using algorithms used to analyze the web.
A potential modification to this method that may yield more interesting results for deter-
mining influencers is to observe the change in hub and authority values over time for a particular
user or set of users. A change in hub or authority values may indicate a change in reputation which
may or may not be related to an event (disaster or otherwise). Further, different input graphs may
be created based on the interaction between users instead of simply their declared social network
in order to cull out extra users who may not be important in the network.
3.15 Summary
In this chapter I have investigated a number of analysis methods and tools that may better
inform us as to the form and function of user behavior as it pertains to inferring reputation. Table
3.2 is a matrix of analysis methods and tools versus data attributes on which they operate.
3.15.1 Analysis Methods and Tools Not Described
Many analysis methods and tools exist for investigating the data available to us in social
networks, and I have covered a number of tools that demonstrate the most promise for inferring
reputation. However, other tools are available that I did not cover but warrant further review.
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Pizzuti [96] proposes a method to detect overlapping communities, the same goal as that of the
Clique Percolation Method described in section 3.9. Van Dongen [119] proposes a method to cluster
vertices in a graph based on stochastic flow simulation. Bagrow [6] proposes a local community
detection method in the same family as the local method described in section 3.13. Many of the
clustering methods that have been inspired from biology and genetics compared by Huttenhower
et al. in have not been included in this analysis. Flake et al. [36] propose a community detection
algorithm that is based on max-flow of vertices in the graph. Chun et al. apply the disparity metric
to the social graph in Cyworld to show the spread of activity of a user over all friends. Blei et al.
[14] propose an unsupervised topic modeling method to determine groupings of words as topics.
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Table 3.2: Matrix of analysis methods and data attributes
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Statistics/probability X X X X X X X X X
Network motifs X X X
Similarity measures X X X X X X X X X X X X X
TF-IDF X X X X X
LDA X X
N -grams X X X X X
K -means X X X X X X X X X X X X X
PageRank X X
Betweenness Centrality X X X
Global Hier. Clust. X X X
Clique Percolation X X
Nearest Neighbor X X
K -core Decomp. X X
Activity Network X X X
Local Hier. Clust. X X
HITS X X X X X X
Chapter 4
Twitter Data
The research performed in this thesis uses public data available from the Twitter social
network. In this chapter I give an overview of the data that exists in Twitter and describe the
limitations of the data as well as the limitations of collecting the data. We will also show some
general statistics of a sample of the data.
4.1 Twitter API and Data Formats
The Twitter social network is available as a web interface in which people are able to login
and post messages and read the messages of those users they follow. However, for the purposes
of this research, I need access to large amounts of data that are cumbersome to collect via a web
crawler. Twitter does provide an application programming interface (API) that allows for direct
access to the data via a collection program.1
The API available from Twitter uses a RESTful2 interface that is easily accessible through
all major programming languages and some command-line unix tools. In section 3.1 I described the
different types of data available in social networks. The types of data available from the Twitter
service include the three major categories of message and profile text, associated metadata, and
the declared social graph between users.
The data from each API call may be returned in varying formats specified by the developer.
1 http://dev.twitter.com
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representational State Transfer
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Those formats include JavaScript Object Notation3 (JSON), Atom Syndication Format4 (ATOM),
and Extensible Markup Language5 (XML). Each of these formats may be parsed to extract the
data from the query for use in my analysis.
The Twitter API consists of three distinct types:
(1) Search API - Allows for searching for tweets that match a set of keywords back in history
(2) Streaming API - Allows for searching for tweets that match a set of keywords as the tweets
are created by users real-time
(3) REST API - Allows for querying for tweets, user profiles, and the social graph matching
specific values
The search API has undergone many changes during its existence, originally starting as a
company acquisition by Twitter, and most recently it has been migrated to using a full Lucene
backend [117]. Tweet results from search are always returned in decreasing order based on time
which has effects on what information users are most likely to see when they search for information
on the network. The streaming API was developed as a means to obtain tweets matching keywords,
user IDs, and location polygons [116]. The REST API allows access to data using queries that are
not based on keyword. There are numerous methods that exist that allow access to all data using
user IDs, usernames , timestamps, and others. Examples include queries to gather a user’s full
tweet stream history or friends and followers.
4.2 Collection Limitations
There exist a number of limitations when attempting to collect data from any of the three
above API interfaces. Here I describe each of these limitations.
First and foremost, Twitter sets rate limits based on both authenticated users accessing the
service as well as un-authenticated requests from any public IP address [114]. These limits have
3 http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4627, http://www.json.org
4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atom %28standard%29
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XML
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varied over time, but typically default values are 350 requests per hour for an authenticated user
and 150 requests per hour for un-authenticated requests from a specific IP address. These limits
may be raised to “whitelisted” status by contacting Twitter for such a status. These requests
require justification, and in fact for this research, Twitter has granted five IP addresses whitelisted
status. Whitelisted status may apply to both authenticated requests and IP addresses, effectively
raising the rate limits for both to 20,000 requests per hour. Further, many requests for information
(such as tweets or friends/followers) require multiple individual API calls in order to gather all the
desired information. For example, Twitter will return a maximum of 5000 user IDs per friend or
follower requests as a “page” of data. This implies that if a user has say, 13,000 followers, three
total requests must be made to collect all of this data, and each individual page request deducts
from the overall allowed limit per hour. Additionally, Twitter currently has a limitation of only
exposing the most recent 3,200 tweets posted by a user [118].
Another limitation in accessing data from Twitter appears in the network latency per query.
Query response times vary depending on the type of query and the time of day the query is made.
For example, a query for a user’s latest tweet may be modified to include or exclude the user profile
in the response. If the profile is included then the response time is greater due to the extra database
query on the Twitter servers to obtain this extra information to be returned in the response. The
time of day of the query also affects the overall response time due to standard internet latency times
that vary with peak usage during the day versus the night. Our observed query response times
have ranged from 200-500ms due to the described factors, and to fully exhaust 20,000 requests per
hour requires one request every 180ms. In order to fully utilize these resources, I must incorporate
multi-threading to reduce the amount of time waiting due to network latency.
The final limitation I encounter includes errors returned by Twitter for valid queries. Twitter
defines many of their own HTTP status codes for errors [115] and many are encountered when
attempting to query all types of data in Twitter. The streaming API nominally will stay open until
the client closes the connection, but occasionally Twitter will return an error, or there will be other
local networking issues that cause the connection to drop. We must write in logic to re-connect
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to the streaming API when a connection drops. Also in the search and REST APIs, Twitter will
occasionally throw one of it’s 500-level response errors, and in some rare cases, will completely hang
the connection. Further, there are other factors which may cause other 400-level requests, such as
a user changing their username (the user ID is the only attribute that is immutable), or by a user
account being suspended due to terms of service violations. I must account for all of these errors
when trying to collect the data.
4.3 Twitter Data and Attributes
Assuming I have accounted for all of the above described limitations in collecting the data, I
must now understand what data I have exactly, as well as the limitations of that data and what I
can do to infer missing information using additional collection techniques. The three major types
of data obtained from Twitter are the user profiles, tweets generated by users, and the social graph
friends and followers connections for users. Here I give real-world examples of each of these data.
Table 4.1 contains all of the key/value pairs of attributes for user “schenkmanus”. The bolded
attributes are the ones used in this research to determine influence and reputation. The user ID is
one of few immutable attributes of a user and is what I use for the primary key when tracking users.
We are also interested in the friends and followers counts for various reasons will will be described
in section 4.5.2. The screen name attribute I also care about since that is how most average users
find others, even though the name can be changed at any time. The time zone/UTC offset are
also an interesting attributes as they may tell us a general area in which a user may reside. The
location field may also tell us where a user may be, depending on whether or not that user has
entered in a valid location.
Table 4.2 contains all the key/value pairs of attributes for the latest tweet by user “schenkmanus”.
The bolded attributes again are the ones used in this research. Three similar attributes appear in
the tweet which are “coordinates”, “place”, and “geo”. These three attributes are various ways in
which Twitter includes geographic information such as lattitude/longitude for tweets if the user
who posted that tweet enabled GPS or a related feature on their device used at that time. We also
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see the actual tweet text included, as well as the timestamp of that tweet. Additionally we also
have the source application (such as the web or various phone applications) that people use to post
messages.
Table 4.3 contains two lists representing the social graph of user “schenkmanus”, one of
friends (out-going links made to other users) and one of followers (in-coming links made by other
users to this one). Two separate REST API calls must be made to gather each of these lists. Note
that the information returned for these requests is minimal, only including a list of users. This
has implications which I will describe in section 4.4. In this case user “schenkmanus” has very few
friends and followers which is not the average [57].
Already one can see that there are a number of attributes that are not necessary but are
included in all responses anyway. Some attributes are even duplicated across multiple queries. In
section 4.5.2 I look at the attributes more in depth.
4.4 Data Limitations
A number of limitations appear when analyzing the data returned from Twitter. At a first
observation, Twitter stores very little information about users in general, with only giving fields for
time zone, location, name, and description as identifiers of the user. This is in comparison with,
say, Facebook that contains numerous fields for users to store attributes describing their activities
or interests. With the data available to us, a number of issues arise, and I will describe some of
the major issues encountered in the data analysis. This is not an exhaustive list, but a sample to
illustrate the issues.
First, the data returned from the same API call may vary depending on the format requested.
For example, the ATOM format follows a specific schema which forces Twitter to modify data,
specifically the tweet text when a tweet is a re-tweet. This forces researchers such as myself to
accommodate for these variations by trial and error, and Twitter may make changes with these
subtle variations without notification.
Second, profile fields are not validated by Twitter in any way. For example, the “location”
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Table 4.1: Table of Twitter profile values returned from the REST API for user “schenkmanus”.
Keys and values in bold are those used in data analysis for this research. Values of “None” are
equivalent to null or empty.
Key Value
follow request sent None
profile use background image True
id 59859467
verified False
profile sidebar fill color 252429
profile text color 666666
followers count 6
protected False
location earth
profile background color 1A1B1F
id str 59859467
status <See table 4.2 for the format of a tweet>
utc offset -25200
statuses count 11
description CS geek, programming, sysadmin, music, composing,
colorado, Hiking, biking, totorcycling, travel
friends count 4
profile link color 2FC2EF
profile image url http://a1.twimg.com/profile images
/330294609/evilherbert normal.jpg
notifications None
show all inline media False
geo enabled False
profile background image url http://s.twimg.com/a/1288305442/images
/themes/theme9/bg.gif
name Chris Schenk
lang en
profile background tile False
favourites count 0
screen name schenkmanus
url None
created at Fri Jul 24 19:06:11 +0000 2009
contributors enabled False
time zone Mountain Time (US & Canada)
profile sidebar border color 181A1E
following None
listed count 0
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Table 4.2: Table of attributes of the latest Tweet by user “schenkmanus” from the REST API.
Keys and values in bold are those used in data analysis for this research. Values of “None” are
equivalent to null or empty.
Key Value
favorited False
retweeted status <The original tweet that may or may not have been
retweeted will be embedded here and has the same for-
mat of the tweet represented in this table with the orig-
inal author’s attributes listed.>
contributors None
truncated False
text RT @extralife: It occurs to me that today’s
comic means zero to anyone not familiar with
Gauntlet. http://bit.ly/9aizuo
created at Thu Sep 30 00:21:16 +0000 2010
retweeted False
in reply to status id None
coordinates None
id 25931435478
source web
in reply to status id str None
place None
in reply to user id None
in reply to screen name None
retweet count None
geo None
in reply to user id str None
id str 25931435478
Table 4.3: Table of friends and followers of user “schenkmanus” as they are returned from Twitter
via the REST API. This user is barely active in the network and as such, these lists are very small.
Typical users have more friends and followers on average [57].
schenkmanus
Friends Followers
1374921 1374921
2989151 2989151
6274662 72343273
12753892
23838490
627466
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field is simply a text box in which a user may list his or her location. As you can see in table 4.1,
user “schenkmanus” has listed his location to be “earth”.
Third, the notion of a “re-tweet” is a home-grown idea from the community and not a feature
initially implemented by Twitter. Over time Twitter included support for re-tweets, but they are
unable to track all the ways in which a message is duplicated on the network. As such, I must
search for the multiple ways in which a tweet may be re-tweeted which may change over time based
on the user population.
Fourth, no timestamp data is included with the friend/follower lists so I have no knowledge
of when a user was friended or followed by another. Interestingly, Twitter does return the lists of
users in relative order in which they were friended or followed, but that is not granular enough
for my goals. As such, I must come up with interesting collection techniques such as collecting a
user’s friend/follower lists periodically to see how those lists change. We use this technique in the
algorithm described in chapter 6.
4.5 Statistics for Labor Day 2010 Boulder Fires Data
Before I am able to start searching for influential users in any data set, I first want to explore
the data and see what properties appear using different metrics. I compute numerous statistics on
the attributes and text available from the data collection. I use a dataset collected from the Boulder
Four Mile Canyon fire that started around 10:00am on Monday, September 6th, 2010. During this
time the search and streaming APIs were utilized to search for users using the keywords and phrases
boulderfire, boulder, 4milefire, fourmilefire, and fourmilecanyon. The implication is that
this list is additive, increasing as more people talk about the fire. Subsequently once every 30
minutes I collected the friend/follower lists from the REST API of the unique users that appeared
from the search and streaming API results at that time, however I analyze the social graph data
in chapters 5 and 6.
The statistics generated for the data are as follows. All counts generated are sorted descend-
ing.
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• Counts of the total number of tweets generated by a user. Note that this number will
always cap at 3200 tweets for users limited by Twitter as mentioned in section 4.1.
• Counts of hashtag occurrences
• Counts of username mentions
• Counts of addressed messages from user A to user B
• Counts of the number of times a user was re-tweeted within the data set
• Counts of the number of times user A re-tweeted user B, a more granular statistic than the
previous statistic
• Counts of different URLs that are posted by users
• Counts of the number of times an application was used to post a message, such as the
Twitter web interface or other third-party applications
• Counts and plots of the latitude/longitude information included in tweets
• Counts of the number of users and edges in the social graph as well as top-ranked in-degree
users
Additionally, any geo-location information is pulled from the tweet metadata and frequency
and graphs of how many tweets are posted each hour are also generated. Each of these statistics
may be computed on a group of users or for individuals. I am also able to limit the statistics to
a specific time window given starting and ending dates and times in order to understand behavior
during the event as it compares to general behavior.
4.5.1 Qualitative Influencers
Given that the Boulder fire occurred within the city in which I live, my fellow researchers
were able to interact directly with people who were speaking actively about the fire. As such, one of
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Table 4.4: A qualitative list of influencers during the Boulder fire of Labor Day 2010 as given by
fellow researcher Jo White.
Users
epiccolorado laurasrecipies HumaneBoulder fishnette
suzanbond CampSteve ConnectColorado Org9
metroseen palen sophiabliu Mediamum
Tanukun eadvocate kate30 CU BoulderChannel1
my fellow researchers, Jo White, gave me a qualitative list of users in Twitter who were considered
influential during this fire. Table 4.4 is that list of users. Note that user “BoulderChannel1” is
considered an influencer but is also known as putting forth mis-information about the fire and not
interacting in a helpful manner during the fire. However, many of the posts by this user propagated
through the network and therefore is considered influential, even if also delinquent. I use this list
to see where these influential users are appearing in the different statistics. I will return to this list
in the social graph analysis in chapters 5 and 6.
4.5.2 Statistics of the First 24 Hours and First Week
Here I compare statistics from the first 24 hours of the fire as well as the first week of the
fire. The specific time windows begin with Monday, September 6th, 2010 at 10:00:00am MDT and
end with Tuesday, September 7th, 2010 at 10:00:00am MDT and Monday, September 13th, 2010
for the 24-hour and one week windows, respectively. The 24-hour data set contains 398 users and
the week-long data set contains 13,955 users, demonstrating the additional involvement of new
users over time. The number of tweets seen during both time periods are 12,147 and 2,314,700,
respectively.
I begin with table 4.5 which is a simple count of tweets for each user in the data set and
the associated rate of posting. This information tells us who is most active in posting in this
selected group. As you can see from the table, four of the sixteen qualitatively influential users
are listed and are highlighted in bold in the 24-hour column. As the event continues during the
week, many more people are speaking about the fire and very active users appear at the top of
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the list, about many of whom I have no information and are most likely not involved at all, but
merely mentioning the fire using a re-tweet or one of the keywords used in the initial tweet search.
We do see a well-known Boulder resident and technology entrepreneur, “andrewhyde”, appear in
the data, and others appear in other statistics as well. One user, “364news”, hits the 3200 tweet
limit imposed by Twitter as described in section 4.4. The average and median number of tweets
per person during the first day are 30.52 and 9.00, respectively. The average and median number
of tweets per person during the first week are 165.87 and 38.00, respectively.
In table 4.6 I show the counts for all hashtags found within the data set. A hashtag is an
alpha-numeric-underscore string prepended with the pound sign. Examples include #boulderfire,
#4milefire, and #real estate. As can be seen in the 24-hour column, a number of boulder and
fire-related hashtags appear, including #boulderfire, #boulder, #fourmilefire, #fourmile-
canyonfire, #4milefire, #wildfire, and possibly #colorado. However, one can see that the
only hashtag that survives among the noisy week-long data is #boulderfire. We see the surge of
the “friend friday” hashtag in the one week data (denoted by #ff) and a mention of the San Bruno,
California gas pipeline explosion that occurred in the same week (denoted by #sanbrunofire).
The total numbers of hashtags seen for the first day and first week are 7,422 and 756,785, respec-
tively. The numbers of unique hashtags seen for the first day and first week are 895 and 66,765,
respectively. The average and median appearance of a hashtag seen during the first day are 8.29
and 1.00, respectively. The average and median appearance of a hashtag seen during the first week
are 11.34 and 1.00, respectively.
Table 4.7 shows the top username mentions in all the tweet streams of the users confined to
the Boulder fire data sets. A username mention is simply the appearance of a username in a tweet,
such as “@schenkmanus” or “@fishnette”. As can be seen in the table, we see more of the qualitative
users in the set during the 24-hour period, and as more users enter the event network, a lot of noise
is introduced and we see many other usernames appear that have no relevance. Some qualitative
influencers still appear in the one week column, but we see celebrities such as “@justinbieber”
and “@barackobama” and local news outlets such as “@cbs4denver” and “@denverpost”. The
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Table 4.5: A list of the top 25 users with the most tweet counts and associated post rate of each
user in tweets per hour in the 24-hour and one week data sets. Users highlighted in bold are part
of the qualitative set listed in table 4.4.
24-Hour One Week
Rank User Count Rate User Count Rate
1 fishnette 394 16.4 364news 3200 19.0
2 wind4me 343 14.3 markayitea 3073 18.3
3 puregemstore 335 14.0 carlosmethelly 2919 17.4
4 shravanp 323 13.5 jonchan02 2696 16.0
5 smartmarketing1 302 12.6 batin is 2687 16.0
6 brendanloy 285 11.9 norskeaviser 2614 15.6
7 tuckertown 267 11.1 hitsbyzuk 2609 15.5
8 world policy 259 10.8 kshypptl 2594 15.4
9 tanukun 251 10.5 dropshipperssa 2567 15.3
10 stiftioree4 241 10.0 indianews247 2561 15.2
11 mattters 240 10.0 djilanihr 2534 15.1
12 karoli 237 9.9 carlosgil83 2523 15.0
13 alltop science 225 9.4 keruffworldnews 2520 15.0
14 sitfu 216 9.0 kpjobs 2506 14.9
15 newsfeeding 211 8.8 vehixcar 2500 14.9
16 hlane 209 8.7 dhayes1098 2500 14.9
17 nicolew247 207 8.6 mikes web page 2486 14.8
18 epiccolorado 183 7.6 cosmonet news 2482 14.8
19 andrewhyde 175 7.3 selvan tengy 2478 14.8
20 twnstar2 155 6.5 cronaca24 2470 14.7
21 theroseinbloom 154 6.4 spotifyuri 2469 14.7
22 sarajuliet 148 6.2 bigmikepromo 2469 14.7
23 notperfume 143 6.0 thenewsblotter 2466 14.7
24 highnicole 138 5.8 phayes4342 2460 14.6
25 mediamum 136 5.7 0341marktplaats 2459 14.6
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Table 4.6: A list of the top 25 hashtags in use by all users who mentioned at least one keyword
related to the Boulder fire. Note that many hashtags appear that are completely unrelated to the
event. The counts for the one week data have been normalized to per-day averages in column 5 for
comparison with the 24-hour window.
24-Hour One Week
Rank Hashtag Count Hashtag Count Daily Avg.
1 #boulderfire 2767 #boulderfire 27982 3997.4
2 #boulder 513 #jobs 20991 2998.7
3 #news 432 #news 19948 2849.7
4 #fire 255 #ff 14368 2052.6
5 #src 151 #tcot 13113 1873.3
6 #loc 135 #p2 8692 1241.7
7 #evac 134 #health 5542 791.7
8 #business 91 #quote 5076 725.1
9 #info 83 #fb 4963 709.0
10 #fourmilefire 61 #socialmedia 4737 676.7
11 #fourmilecanyonfire 59 #sanbrunofire 4337 619.6
12 #politics 56 #fashion 4247 606.7
13 #4milefire 56 #follow 3960 565.7
14 #wildfire 47 #ebc 3729 532.7
15 #hermine 46 #pets 3728 532.6
16 #shelter 37 #tweetmyjobs 3319 474.1
17 #soccer 36 #pakistan 3319 474.1
18 #fb 35 #bookmark 2897 413.9
19 #world 35 #1 2747 392.4
20 #fifa 35 #business 2679 382.7
21 #2010 35 #iranelection 2607 372.4
22 #cup 35 #in 2553 364.7
23 #sports 34 #kaiser 2510 358.6
24 #colorado 34 #travel 2507 358.1
25 #offer 32 #teamfollowback 2472 353.1
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percentages of users that mention at least one other user in the first day and first week period are
77.39% (308 users) and 79.08% (11,036 users), respectively. The total numbers of mentions seen
during the first day and first week are 7,877 and 1,224,851, respectively. The average and median
numbers of mentions per user during the first day are 19.79 and 1.00, respectively. The average
and median numbers of mentions per user during the first week are 87.77 and 1.00, respectively.
In table 4.8 I review the number of addressed messages sent between users during the different
time windows. Addressed messages are considered to be those that begin with either “@username”
or prepended with a period as “.@username” (both cases without quotes). The highlighted users
are part of the qualitative set, and we can see in this case that only two of the qualitative set appear
at the top of this list. Again in the one week column, the noise appears when additional users are
added into the event network and numerous messages are sent between users who are unknown
and are most likely not about the Boulder fire. Interestingly, some users address messages to
themselves, as demonstrated by user “back2lifeinc” ranked third in the one week data set. The
percentages of messages that are addressed messages during the first day and first week are 18.85%
(2,291 messages) and 15.90% (368,047 messages), respectively. The percentages of users who have
sent at least one addressed message to others during the first day and first week are 57.04% (227
users) and 60.22% (8,404 users), respectively.
Table 4.9 shows the top re-tweeted users during the two time windows. Here we see a general
pattern of news outlets being re-tweeted among people, but we do see some of the qualitative set
of users appearing in the list. For the first time we see user “BoulderChannel1” appear using this
metric. The percentages of messages that are considered re-tweets during the first day and first
week are 32.88% (3,994 messages) and 21.81% (504,836 messages). The numbers of unique users
re-tweeted during the first day and first week are 1,456 and 134,204, respectively. Of those users
re-tweeted, the percentages of users actually speaking of the Boulder fire during the first day and
first week are 24.45% (356 users) and 1.55% (2,085 users), respectively.
Table 4.10 shows the top re-tweeted source-target user pairs during the two time windows.
This measure is a more fine-grained measure than the previous total count as show in table 4.9.
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Table 4.7: A list of the top 25 username mentions in the 24-hour and one week data sets of the
Boulder fire. Highlighted users in bold are part of the qualitatively influential set of users.
24-Hour One Week
Rank Username Count Username Count
1 fishnette 540 addthis 4131
2 andrewhyde 223 breakingnews 3150
3 cbs4denver 197 jinxbeatz 2554
4 epiccolorado 188 mikes web page 2416
5 denverchannel 87 youtube 2310
6 mediamum 79 epiccolorado 1861
7 kwgndenver 69 cnnbrk 1812
8 wind4me 50 fishnette 1732
9 thefiretracker2 46 laurasrecipes 1560
10 bouldercounty 46 addtoany 1486
11 humaneboulder 42 justinbieber 1484
12 twitter 41 nytimes 1479
13 dailycamera 39 mashable 1383
14 sandrafish 39 dapitarchuletoy 1292
15 hlane 38 cbs4denver 1199
16 jamesazure 35 c1 1171
17 laurasrecipes 34 barackobama 1151
18 sarajuliet 33 tweetsmarter 1075
19 tuckertown 30 denverchannel 1071
20 suzanbond 30 mikeposner 1065
21 ev 28 denverpost 1064
22 coloradodaily 27 flipbooks 1064
23 beregond 27 cnn 1013
24 kgnu 26 nasa 941
25 shellimeyers 26 thefiretracker2 925
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Table 4.8: A list of the top 25 counts of addressed messages originating from users speaking of the
Boulder fire within the first day and first week. The message sent to the target user in this context
does not imply the users were speaking of the fire directly. Users highlighted in bold are part of
the qualitative set.
24-Hour One Week
Source Target Count Source Target Count
bellamom beregond 27 darebat c1 809
wind4me fishnette 25 kizziecherry gogumba 697
tuckertown lrockwellatty 20 back2lifeinc back2lifeinc 579
brendanloy inthebleachers 19 darebat iquit 573
brendanloy jeremysbn 19 ei econewsfeed ecointernet 521
brendanloy kilroyfsu 16 socbookmarks iquaks 415
wind4me cbs4denver 13 seobookmarks iquaks 415
tuckertown drmarm 11 davidakhoa c1 361
theroseinbloom monkeyxplosion 11 yomarques lynndaisbellamy 293
karoli harrylyme 11 davidakhoa iquit 274
hlane scottc10 10 bookmarkingnet youblr 260
mike flys cholubaz 9 radu palanga irinabbz 258
highnicole sinisterlukey 9 garyblackmon gumbyiam 255
andrewhyde fishnette 9 lissaloucraigy2 sematalba 247
priscillast fishnette 9 allstarmn sarahallstar94 240
rdwnggrl depmodechick 9 radu palanga 100tulip 240
fishnette priscillast 9 jesusfan 420 ofinfinitejest 231
mike flys dhindmanjr 9 allstarmn itsheather7 223
sarajuliet fishnette 9 radu palanga dearmikeyway 213
brendanloy andy staples 8 karu1402 bensonthehusky 205
fishnette andrewhyde 8 beeblez reddirtisland 202
fishnette sarajuliet 8 mysticjeremy forbescarolinev 199
scobleizer kichigai 8 bluecornpie ally1r 189
kkartphoto laurasrecipes 7 tellydubby anniewestdotcom 188
scobleizer srikanth br 7 theliterator coloursfading 181
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Table 4.9: A list of the top 25 re-tweeted users in the first day and first week of the Boulder fire.
The one week counts are normalized to per-day averages for comparison with the 24-hour counts.
Users highlighted in bold are part of the qualitative set.
24-Hour One Week
Rank User Count User Count Daily avg.
1 fishnette 301 addthis 4097 585.3
2 andrewhyde 143 breakingnews 3058 436.9
3 cbs4denver 140 youtube 2157 308.1
4 epiccolorado 127 addtoany 1486 212.3
5 denverchannel 69 cnnbrk 1354 193.4
6 kwgndenver 56 epiccolorado 1185 169.3
7 mediamum 46 nytimes 1132 161.7
8 bouldercounty 36 tweetsmarter 997 142.4
9 thefiretracker2 35 flipbooks 978 139.7
10 dailycamera 27 cbs4denver 969 138.4
11 wind4me 27 greychampion 910 130.0
12 breakingnews 25 denverchannel 899 128.4
13 kgnu 24 denverpost 882 126.0
14 coloradodaily 24 mashable 870 124.3
15 boulderchannel1 23 nasa 842 120.3
16 hkoren 21 fishnette 819 117.0
17 kkartphoto 21 thefiretracker2 748 106.9
18 schwartznow 20 laurasrecipes 739 105.6
19 cnnbrk 20 wxchannel 729 104.1
20 cuindependent 19 huffingtonpost 708 101.1
21 tuckertown 19 thenewsblotter 638 91.1
22 humaneboulder 18 detikcom 596 85.1
23 suzanbond 18 kike230 575 82.1
24 douginboulder 17 pixelproject 573 81.9
25 jamesazure 17 mparent77772 570 81.4
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We immediately see that the noise of the week-long data set drowns out any interaction between
users active in the Boulder fire. We do see many people re-tweeting user “fishnette” in the 24-hour
period.
Table 4.11 shows the top-25 encountered urls in the two time windows. Users very frequently
share URLs that are shortened using services from domains that are themselves short (such as
“bit.ly”) and use a hash function to encode the remainder of the URL and then forward the request
to the target URL. Due to this feature, I am unable to immediately see what are the actual top
URL destinations. In order to determine this information, I must use URL expander services or
write a script that follows the links until an HTTP 200 response is encountered, signifying the
final destination of the links. Without this process, these URLs are meaningless by themselves.
We also see one of the abhorrent behaviors of Twitter in this table with truncated URLs, such as
“http://b” and others. This is due to requesting ATOM format in the API call, and in the case of
re-tweets, Twitter will prepend the text with the “RT @username” construct and truncate the tail
of the message which typically contains the URL. Requesting JSON format from the API call does
not introduce this behavior. The total numbers of unique URLs seen during the first day and first
week are 4,105 and 1,200,927, respectively.
Table 4.12 lists the top 25 applications utilized by users to access Twitter. There exist
numerous applications that allow users to access Twitter. In the 24-hour period we see 85 unique
applications and in the one week period we see 1,026 unique applications. The percentages listed
in the table are calculated from totals of 12,147 and 2,314,700 tweets for the 24-hour and one week
time windows, respectively. The application name actually appears as HTML and the name is
parsed out from the HTML itself and is displayed in the table. By itself, this information isn’t very
useful, but observing the dynamics of what applications are used by people during events compared
to their normal behavior may yield interesting behavioral patterns.
Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 show the locations of tweets by 30 users among the 398 total users in
the 24-hour data set, accounting for 7.53% of the users. Among these 30 users, 172 tweets contained
latitude/longitude data, accounting for 1.42% of the 12,147 tweets seen during the first day. All of
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Table 4.10: A list of the top 25 re-tweeted users in the first day and first week of the Boulder fire.
The user in the source column is the originator of the tweet. Users highlighted in bold are part of
the qualitative set.
24-Hour One Week
Re-tweeter Source Count Re-tweeter Source Count
wind4me fishnette 59 canadianinjured greychampion 910
tanukun fishnette 37 nygnowlivetv addthis 663
cuindependent fishnette 27 kike230 kike230 575
mediamum epiccolorado 25 hopemarie 25 peacekaren 25 506
sarajuliet fishnette 24 mamalou52 virtual abbey 356
epiccolorado fishnette 23 ishfaq01 addtoany 347
michaelevs cbs4denver 20 retweeter33 flipbooks 346
theroseinbloom fishnette 19 jap4haiti haiti 11 340
twnstar2 cnnbrk 16 pacifictimesmag youtube 335
wind4me cbs4denver 16 viravita viravita 315
tuckertown cbs4denver 16 mudpie25 dylano 311
palen epiccolorado 15 batin is detikcom 307
michaelevs kwgndenver 14 lodispirit pixelproject 282
wind4me denverchannel 14 newmediadevotee ericpratum 260
jennar fishnette 12 actionscript3 shary20 254
torqueflite tuckertown 12 jazzyaditya detikcom 253
notperfume nannersmom 12 quintinreports thenewsblotter 253
velofemme fishnette 11 8service addthis 247
tanukun thefiretracker2 9 thenewshome addtoany 239
twnstar2 thefiretracker2 9 jonchan02 globalgrind 229
hlane fishnette 9 angelwings0511 adamsconsulting 208
wind4me andrewhyde 9 viravita andinifaramitha 203
cuindependent andrewhyde 9 riqhimon riqhimon 200
notperfume petmamma 9 batin is kompasdotcom 200
wind4me joshlarson 8 cosmoweb cosmoweb 191
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Table 4.11: A list of the top 15 URLs appearing in the two data sets. Due to idiosyncrasies of the
Twitter API when requesting ATOM format, some URLs are truncated.
24-Hour
Rank Url Count
1 http://bit.ly/ccX7kH 30
2 http://twitpic.com/2m1ghy 29
3 http://www.radioreference.com/apps/audio/?action=wp&feedId=591 23
4 http:// 20
5 http://bit.ly/9yxpOQ 19
6 http://bit.ly/cYIVtM 16
7 http://bit.ly/9c2GjV 14
8 http://bit.ly/bh93Fu 13
9 http://twitpic.com/2lw39r 13
10 http://boulderoem.com/component/content/article/5 13
11 http://bit.ly/c2wnXh 12
12 http://post.ly/vyWH 12
13 http://bit.ly/9IuULq 12
14 http://bit.ly/9AX3JL 12
15 http://bit.ly/b3Mvqx 11
One Week
Rank Url Count
1 http://bit.ly/5yluCl 3028
2 http://bit.ly/9n3Ifc 2249
3 http://thenewslist.com 1766
4 http://bit.ly/b6xyyB 1595
5 http:// 1489
6 http://malufor.ch 1111
7 http://bit.ly/4vPZm1 1062
8 http://bit.ly/9t0MRU 1055
9 http://CarlosGil.us 951
10 http://ow.ly/2k6oa 894
11 http://bit.ly/cbhpXo 848
12 http://ow.ly/2k4Sf 846
13 http://adf.ly/5FcS 820
14 http://www.bit.ly/lookingforwork 780
15 http://b 748
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Table 4.12: A list of the top 25 source applications used by the users in the Boulder fire network.
Tweet totals for both time windows are 12,147 and 2,314,700 for 24-hour and one week, respectively.
The distribution percentages are given.
24-Hour One Week
Source Count Percent Source Count Percent
web 3471 28.57 twitterfeed 801610 34.63
twitterfeed 2541 20.92 web 453113 19.58
TweetDeck 2457 20.23 TweetDeck 197643 8.54
Echofon 565 4.65 HootSuite 94240 4.07
Twitter for iPhone 548 4.51 U¨berTwitter 63977 2.76
HootSuite 418 3.44 Twitter for iPhone 63774 2.76
Tweetie for Mac 322 2.65 dlvr.it 44222 1.91
Seesmic Desktop 247 2.03 Echofon 38997 1.68
U¨berTwitter 165 1.36 Ping.fm 31788 1.37
Wowd api 165 1.36 Google 30675 1.33
Twitterrific 128 1.05 Twitter for BlackBerry 26068 1.13
Twitter for iPad 127 1.05 mobile web 23750 1.03
twidroid 100 0.82 txt 21477 0.93
hottopics7 94 0.77 twidroid 15056 0.65
Twitter for BlackBerry 88 0.72 Seesmic Desktop 13232 0.57
Twitpic 78 0.64 SocialOomph 10879 0.47
Twitter for Android 58 0.48 Tweetie for Mac 10648 0.46
mobile web 54 0.44 Twittelator 10477 0.45
Seesmic for Android 42 0.35 Tweet Button 8866 0.38
TweetMeme 37 0.30 TweetCaster 8705 0.38
txt 36 0.30 Twitter for Android 8261 0.36
Tweet Button 31 0.26 TwitBird 8238 0.36
TweetCaster 28 0.23 Visibli 6710 0.29
YoruFukurou 28 0.23 Facebook 6707 0.29
foursquare 26 0.21 Seesmic for Android 6556 0.28
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the 172 points were plotted in a Google map using the Google Maps API.6 The first map in figure
4.1 shows users from California, Nevada, Wisconsin and Indiana did speak about the Boulder fire
in some way. Zooming in closer to Denver in figure 4.2 and 4.3 shows the higher density of Tweets
appearing in Boulder.
The number of users in the one week data that gave location information is 858, accounting
for 6.14% of the users. Among those users, the number of tweets that contain latitude/longitude
location information is 17,903, accounting for 0.77% of the 2,314,700 tweets generated by users
speaking of the fire in any manner during the week. This data is not plotted due to the volume
of points. Points need to be grouped using clustering methods such as k -means (as described in
section 3.5) in order to reduce the overall amount to be feasibly plotted on a map.
Table 4.13 shows information about the social graph associated with users speaking of the
Boulder fire. The table includes the number of users in the network speaking of the fire and the
number of edges connecting those users (considered “active” in the table), as well as all users and
edges encountered in the friends/follower lists. Data are calculated for five different snapshots of
the social network set one day apart from each other beginning with Tuesday, September 7th at
12:40pm and ending on Saturday, September 11th at 3:10pm. As can be seen, the number of users
increases during the week. Although the data suggests people were leaving the network due to the
decrease in users in columns three and four, this is in fact due to data collection errors encountered.
The small-world property [122] of Twitter is immediately apparent with the unique number of users
(in the millions) who are one connection away from those speaking about the Boulder fire.
Table 4.14 shows the ranking of users by the number of followers of users speaking during the
first day of the fire collected on September 7th, 2010 at 12:41pm Mountain time. Both the global
rankings and rankings only among the users who are speaking about the Boulder fire are listed. In
the case of rankings only among the active users in the fire, all user IDs that are encountered that
are not part of the active user set are removed and edges to those users are ignored. In the global
list, no qualitative influencers are found. However, in the list where only users actively speaking
6 http://code.google.com/apis/maps/documentation/javascript/reference.html
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Figure 4.1: An image of latitude/longitude points extracted from tweet post metadata from posts
by users speaking of the Boulder fire in the first 24 hours overlain on a map of the United States.
Table 4.13: A list of statistics of the social graph in one-day increments during the Boulder fire.
Active edges connect the users who are actively speaking about the fire in some way. All edges and
users are counts of all unique users encountered in the data sets.
Timestamps (America/Denver)
2010-09-07 2010-09-08 2010-09-09 2010-09-10 2010-09-11
12:40:01 12:40:01 12:40:01 12:40:01 15:10:01
Users (active) 448 1,631 1,623 1,622 4,039
Users (all) 821,609 2,292,929 2,295,885 2,300,838 4,075,573
Edges (active) 3,142 25,193 25,484 25,664 87,539
Edges (all) 1,510,036 5,361,650 5,370,451 5,372,597 30,458,948
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Figure 4.2: An image of latitude/longitude points extracted from tweet post metadata from posts
by users speaking of the Boulder fire in the first 24 hours, with zoom over the Denver, Colorado
metropolitan area.
98
Figure 4.3: An image of latitude/longitude points extracted from tweet post metadata from posts
by users speaking of the Boulder fire in the first 24 hours, with zoom over the Boulder, Longmont,
and Broomfield cities in Colorado.
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about the fire are considered, qualitative influencers begin to appear in the data set.
4.5.3 Statistics of User “fishnette”
Now I will investigate statistics for individual users. Since user “fishnette” appears a lot in
the statistics from the previous section, I will look at the same statistics from that user’s point of
view. This user’s statistics will be viewed from two different time periods: the time period before
the start of the fire on September 6th, 2010 at 10:00am and data after the start of the fire. This
user joined Twitter Monday, April 28, 2008 at 7:39pm. For comparison with the data from the
previous section, the total number of tweets posted by this user is 394 for the first day as seen in
table 4.5 resulting in the top ranking. This user posted 879 for the first week resulting in a ranking
of 563 which was lost among the high-volume users in the one week time period.
Figure 4.4 shows the monthly post rates for user “fishnette”. Even though this user joined the
network in April of 2008, only the most recent 3,200 tweets are visible due to the limits imposed
by Twitter [118]. However, even with this limitation the general posting behavior is visible. A
significant increase can be seen at the start of September 2010 which correlates with the Boulder
fire. Figure 4.5 shows the posts aggregated by hour of the day. A large amount of posts can be seen
between 11:00am and 12:00pm Mountain time, indicating a possible lunch hour spike in activity.
Sleep hours can also be seen between 11:00pm and 7:00am.
Table 4.15 shows the hashtags in use by “fishnette” during the pre-fire and post-fire time
periods. A variety of hashtags can be seen in the pre-fire time period, but the frequency is low
relative to the week during the fire. The number of hashtags used before the Boulder fire is 273
yielding a ratio of 8.53% of hashtags to tweets out of 3,200 tweets. During the first day of the
fire the ratio increases to 86.80% of 342 hashtags within 394 tweets. This ratio decreases during
the one week data set to 63.82% of 561 hashtags within 879 tweets. Different events can be seen
in hashtags during the one week period as well, such as the #sanbruno hashtag referencing the
San Bruno, California gas fire mentioned previously. The appearance of support hashtags such as
#evac, #loc, and #needs appear as the event evolves and relief needs become apparent and
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Table 4.14: A list of the top 25 users ranked by their number of followers in the data sets collected
for September 7th, 2010 at 12:41pm. The first rankings are of global follower counts and the
second rankings are of counts only among the active users speaking about the Boulder fire. Users
highlighted in bold are in the qualitatively influential set.
All Users Active Users
Rank User ID User Name Count User ID User Name Count
1 13348 Scobleizer 138067 841791 andrewhyde 123
2 24269775 marcelomedici 77627 14504258 dailycamera 98
3 19816859 PublishersWkly 76555 16119689 downtownboulder 97
4 15731368 HowardKurtz 36212 14522630 coloradodaily 88
5 18460854 shellykramer 33082 16313592 cbs4denver 81
6 16971072 taylorphinney 22639 14574055 fishnette 72
7 11425612 EthanJaynes 22006 817209 davidcohen 52
8 56597144 mr q 18212 13348 Scobleizer 52
9 4374531 gwenbell 15239 5124341 Mediamum 51
10 16877611 FoxSports 15137 29527113 OnlyInBoulder 50
11 841791 andrewhyde 11790 12627132 melsidwell 40
12 126444618 THEKASESHOW 11709 14911286 Tekee 40
13 80619999 Freedomman11 10301 4374531 gwenbell 40
14 39553219 KaliMarcum 9485 64876717 HumaneBoulder 40
15 16313592 cbs4denver 8860 85647240 epiccolorado 39
16 53153534 craigslistjobs 8767 14945780 ejoep 35
17 980611 Karoli 8396 6752232 Greeblemonkey 35
18 23996960 Jastewart15 8198 16733088 gratzo 34
19 35346943 pops131 8155 14208757 bouldertweep 33
20 22795877 bigdandbubba 7640 1142941 jenmyronuk 33
21 41326847 salivates 6962 16971072 taylorphinney 33
22 21726778 BellaCullen18 6872 14317338 KezzaMcDezza 32
23 14705116 AmeriCares 6578 24663013 hkoren 31
24 18124625 casinclair 6300 19661756 hlane 31
25 45797123 eraseyourdebt 6275 15791661 fionaschlachter 30
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Figure 4.4: A graph of the posts created each month by user “fishnette” going back to the most
recent 3,200 tweets. A spike in posting activity can be seen in the month of September, correlating
with the start of the Boulder fire.
102
Figure 4.5: A graph of the posts created aggregated by hour of the day by user “fishnette” in the
Mountain time zone. The green line is the average and the red lines are ±1 standard deviation. A
lunch hour and sleep hours are visible.
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vocalized in the community.
Table 4.16 shows the top 25 usernames mentioned in posts by user “fishnette”. As seen in
the overall event data described in the previous section, user “andrewhyde” appears again who is
the local entrepreneur. Other names that are starting to appear multiple times are “wind4me”,
“sarajuliet”, “priscillast”, and “douginboulder”. User “fishnette” also mentions herself a number
of times during the week.
Table 4.17 shows the counts of messages addressed to and from user “fishnette” in both the
24-hour and one week time periods. Table 4.18 shows the top users re-tweeting user “fishnette” and
the top users retweeted by “fishnette”. Finally, the source applications used by user “fishnette”
pre-fire and during the one week time period are listed in table 4.19.
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Table 4.15: A list of the top 15 hashtags in use by user “fishnette” before the Boulder fire, during
the first day of the fire, and during the first week of the fire.
Pre-fire 24-Hour One Week
Hashtag Count Hashtag Count Hashtag Count
#cwa2010 46 #boulderfire 206 #boulderfire 387
#cogopassembly 45 #boulder 51 #boulder 53
#ragbrai 15 #fire 50 #fire 50
#cosen 12 #evac 22 #evac 25
#boulder 9 #bocofire 5 #sanbruno 6
#nicar 7 #cu 2 #bocofire 5
#tcot 7 #fourmilecanyonfire 2 #flatironsfire 4
#spj9 6 #loc 1 #src 3
#igniteboulder 6 #info 1 #loc 3
#gypsyjazz 5 #src 1 #info 2
#cologopassembly 5 #evacuated 1 #scanner 2
#2601 5 - - #cu 2
#cogop 4 - - #fourmilecanyonfire 2
#ipad 4 - - #needs 1
#jaws25 3 - - #fingerscrossed 1
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Table 4.16: A list of the top 25 usernames mentioned by user “fishnette” in the 24-hour and one
week time windows during the Boulder fire. Users highlighted in bold are part of the qualitatively
influential set of users.
24-Hour One Week
Rank Username Count Username Count
1 andrewhyde 18 epiccolorado 31
2 sarajuliet 12 laurasrecipes 29
3 wind4me 10 andrewhyde 21
4 priscillast 10 sarajuliet 17
5 denverchannel 8 denverchannel 15
6 stephanieldavis 6 sophiabliu 13
7 hmcwilliams 6 priscillast 13
8 mediamum 6 wind4me 12
9 pachecod 5 danielpetty 12
10 greeblemonkey 5 fishnette 11
11 catawu 5 mediamum 11
12 fishnette 4 hmcwilliams 10
13 epiccolorado 4 stephanieldavis 9
14 ofuttufo 3 lauren hannah 7
15 davidherrold 3 pugofwar 7
16 douginboulder 3 artworkss 7
17 lioncaller 2 bouldercounty 7
18 tashigonpo108 2 douginboulder 7
19 suesalinger 2 zarchasmpgmr 6
20 metroroadies 2 chelseamoll 6
21 artworkss 2 davidherrold 6
22 hkoren 2 melindadc 5
23 paullewin 2 matical 5
24 trjh 2 ickaickaicka 5
25 milliman 2 catawu 5
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Table 4.17: A list of the top 15 users who have received addressed messages from user “fishnette”
and who have sent addressed messages to user “fishnette” in the 24-hour and one week time periods.
Users highlighted in bold are part of the qualitatively influential set.
Messages from user “fishnette”
24-Hour One Week
Rank Username Count Username Count
1 priscillast 9 laurasrecipes 20
2 andrewhyde 8 sarajuliet 12
3 sarajuliet 8 danielpetty 11
4 wind4me 7 priscillast 10
5 stephanieldavis 5 sophiabliu 10
6 mediamum 5 andrewhyde 10
7 catawu 5 stephanieldavis 8
8 pachecod 4 wind4me 8
9 greeblemonkey 3 lauren hannah 7
10 davidherrold 2 mediamum 7
11 tashigonpo108 2 chelseamoll 6
12 artworkss 2 zarchasmpgmr 6
13 lioncaller 2 artworkss 6
14 vanillagrrl 2 epiccolorado 5
15 metroroadies 2 catawu 5
Messages addressed to user “fishnette”
24-Hour One Week
Rank Username Count Username Count
1 wind4me 25 wind4me 30
2 andrewhyde 9 laurasrecipes 29
3 priscillast 9 sarajuliet 15
4 sarajuliet 9 andrewhyde 13
5 ofuttufo 5 priscillast 11
6 mediamum 5 sophiabliu 9
7 pachecod 5 mediamum 9
8 greeblemonkey 3 danielpetty 7
9 suesalinger 3 zarchasmpgmr 7
10 lioncaller 3 lauren hannah 6
11 nealmcb 2 nuancechaser 6
12 tekee 1 suzanbond 6
13 dhendersonco 1 ofuttufo 5
14 joseph flasher 1 pachecod 5
15 velofemme 1 ickaickaicka 5
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Table 4.18: A list of the top 15 users who have been re-tweeted by “fishnette” and who have re-
tweeted “fishnette” in the 24-hour and one week time periods. Users highlighted in bold are part
of the qualitatively influential set.
Users re-tweeting “fishnette”
24-Hour One Week
Rank Username Count Username Count
1 wind4me 59 wind4me 63
2 tanukun 37 tanukun 46
3 cuindependent 27 epiccolorado 32
4 sarajuliet 24 sarajuliet 31
5 epiccolorado 23 theroseinbloom 29
6 theroseinbloom 19 cuindependent 27
7 jennar 12 laurasrecipes 25
8 velofemme 11 luthers 25
9 hlane 9 tweetingdonal 18
10 suesalinger 8 jennar 18
11 pachecod 7 suzanbond 15
12 agahran 5 hlane 14
13 mediamum 4 suesalinger 13
14 kwgndenver 4 fourmilefire 12
15 greeblemonkey 3 thefiretracker2 12
Users re-tweeted by “fishnette”
24-Hour One Week
Rank Username Count Username Count
1 andrewhyde 8 denverchannel 14
1 denverchannel 8 epiccolorado 12
1 hmcwilliams 4 andrewhyde 9
1 douginboulder 3 hmcwilliams 8
1 wind4me 3 douginboulder 5
1 sarajuliet 3 wind4me 4
1 epiccolorado 2 coloradodaily 4
1 cbs4denver 2 laurasrecipes 4
1 hkoren 2 boulderrescue 3
1 greeblemonkey 2 dailycamera 3
1 stephanieldavis 1 cbs4denver 3
1 yulsman 1 bouldercounty 3
1 shellimeyers 1 hkoren 3
1 pachecod 1 sarajuliet 3
1 davidherrold 1 yulsman 3
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Table 4.19: A list of the top 10 source applications used by user “fishnette”, pre-fire, during the
first day, and during the first week of the Boulder fire.
Pre-fire 24-hour One Week
TweetDeck 1925 TweetDeck 389 TweetDeck 857
Twitter for iPhone 312 Twitter for iPhone 5 Twitter for iPhone 17
API 16 - - Twitter for iPad 3
web 14 - - Tweety Got Back 1
txt 10 - - txt 1
TwitPic 9 - - - -
TweetMeme 2 - - - -
ROFLquiz 1 - - - -
Twitter for iPad 1 - - - -
TimesPeople 1 - - - -
Chapter 5
Analysis of HITS Algorithm
In this chapter I investigate the efficacy of the rankings produced by the Hyperlink-Induced
Topic Search (HITS) algorithm (described in section 3.14) on various types of social graphs from
the September 2010 Boulder fire used as inputs as a means to determine influential users in the
network being considered. Prior to my analysis of the algorithm, I will include an explanation
of the meaning of the ranking values as well as examples to assist the reader in visualizing how
the values correspond to the structure of the graph. The goal is to find a variation of the HITS
algorithm input graph to find the most qualitatively influential users listed in table 4.4.
5.1 Hub and Authority Rank Values
The process of generating hub and authority rank values has been described in section 3.14.2.
However, before describing our analysis of the algorithm, I want to introduce the reader to how the
values relate to the structure of the graph. As described by Kleinberg [65], ”Hubs and authorities
exhibit what could be called a mutually reinforcing relationship: a good hub is a page that points
to many good authorities; a good authority is a page that is pointed to by many good hubs.” The
circular dependency of these values is apparent in the description, but as long as the adjacency
matrix of the graph has a dominant eigenvalue, the algorithm is guaranteed to converge on values
for hubs and authorities given enough iterations.
To illustrate the relationship between hubs and authorities, I present two simple graphs in
figure 5.1 of 5 vertices and 4 edges (5.1(a)) and 6 vertices and 8 edges (5.1(b)), respectively. The
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(a) A simple network graph of 5 vertices and 4 edges.
Vertex 1 is the only hub in the network and vertices
2-5 all equally split the authority score in the network.
(b) A simple network graph of 6 vertices and 8 edges.
Vertices 1 and 6 equally split the hub score in the net-
work and vertices 2-5 again equally split the authority
score in the network.
Figure 5.1: Sample graphs to illustrate the relationships between hubs and authorities. Hubs are
colored in lavender and authorities are colored in cyan.
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Table 5.1: Hub and Authority values corresponding to the graphs in figure 5.1(a).
Rank Hub Value Auth. Value
1 2 0.5 1 1.0
2 3 0.5 2 0.0
3 4 0.5 3 0.0
4 5 0.5 4 0.0
5 1 0.0 5 0.0
invariant maintained during the calculation of the hub and authority values is the sum of the squares
of the values must equal 1. Table 5.1 shows the scores for the graph in figure 5.1(a). Intuitively
we see that vertex 1 is the only hub in the entire graph, and vertices 2-5 share the authority scores
equally. Table 5.2 shows the scores for the graph in figure 5.1(b). This time we see vertices 1 and 6
equally share the hub values for the graph, and the authority values for vertices 2-5 are once again
split equally. We can also see that the invariant is held true as the sum of the hub values in the
graph in figure 5.1(b) sum to one (0.7071 ∼ √2/2, 2×√2/22 = 1).
Figure 5.2 demonstrates a “clique” graph, which is a fully inter-connected directed graph.
The values in table 5.3 show the resulting identical scores for every single vertex in the graph
for both hubs and authorities, as intuitively, no vertex is any more a hub or authority than the
previous.
5.2 Social Graph Data
As described in section 4.5.2, during the Boulder fire the social graph of friends and followers
was collected for each user every 30 minutes starting September 6th, 2010 at 8:40pm Mountain
time. For the analysis in this chapter, one-day increments of the social graph will be analyzed.
Tables 4.13 and 4.14 in section 4.5.2 show statistics of the social graph data collected as well as
rankings of users by in-degree. This will be the data used for comparison with rankings generated
by the HITS algorithm.
Various types of graphs will be input into the HITS algorithm to look for influential users.
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Figure 5.2: A fully inter-connected directed graph, also called a “clique”.
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Table 5.2: Hub and Authority values corresponding to the graphs in figure 5.1(b).
Rank Hub Value Auth. Value
1 2 0.5 1 0.7071
2 3 0.5 6 0.7071
3 4 0.5 2 0.0
4 5 0.5 3 0.0
5 1 0.0 4 0.0
6 6 0.0 5 0.0
Types of graphs include the declared social graphs with variations of that graph as well as graphs
generated from how users are interacting with each other with addressed messages or with username
mentions.
5.2.1 Global Friends/Followers Graph
The global friends/followers graph is considered to be the aggregate data returned for each
user’s individual social graph who were speaking about the Boulder fire. As shown in table 4.13,
the number of users speaking of the Boulder fire on the first day is small (448 users). However, the
total number of unique IDs that are only one hop away from those users is 821,609. The initial
analysis of the HITS algorithm will include all of the unique users seen in the data collection, as
well as pruning of the user list by the frequency by which they appear.
Table 5.4 shows the rankings produced by HITS on varying input graphs after the first day of
the fire on September 7th, 2010 at 12:40pm Mountain time. The first column includes all 821,609
users from the first day, and subsequent columns reduce the number of users included in the graph.
To reduce the number, users are first sorted descending by the frequency in which they appear in
the social graph for this group, and then the top N users are retained in the graph, and all other
users and edges are culled out. In the second and third columns, the top 20,000 and 5,000 most
frequent users are retained in the graph. The fifth column is a reproduction of the ranking of all
users by in-degree from table 4.14 as a baseline comparison.
As can be seen in the table, users who already have a high-indegree are highly ranked by
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Table 5.3: Hub and Authority values corresponding to the graphs in figure 5.2.
Rank Hub Value Auth. Value
1 1 0.3162 1 0.3162
2 2 0.3162 2 0.3162
3 3 0.3162 3 0.3162
4 4 0.3162 4 0.3162
5 5 0.3162 5 0.3162
6 6 0.3162 6 0.3162
7 7 0.3162 7 0.3162
8 8 0.3162 8 0.3162
9 9 0.3162 9 0.3162
10 10 0.3162 10 0.3162
HITS. Even though user “BarackObama” did not speak about the Boulder fire, he is included in
the set because many of the users who do speak of the Boulder fire also link to “BarackObama”.
This causes this user to appear to have a high in-degree, and therefore ranked high among the users
in the set.
5.2.2 Keyword Friends/Followers Graph
A variation on the input graph into HITS is the graph only containing the users who speak
directly about the fire. This graph eliminates any users who are not actively speaking about the
fire, therefore targeting the very users in which I am interested. This eliminates the issue with
users like “BarackObama” from appearing in the set so active users can be targeted for influence.
To create this graph, only users who have used a keyword related to the Boulder fire are considered
and their declared friend/follower edges included in the graph.
Table 5.5 shows the HITS rankings of the users speaking of the Boulder fire on the graph col-
lected on September 7th, 2010 at 12:40pm Mountain time. For comparison, the in-degree rankings
of the same users are given in the second column, only counting edges among those speaking of the
Boulder fire. Comparing the two columns, HITS is performing no better than simply ranking users
by in-degree, and in fact only differ by two users in each set. The HITS ranking includes users
“benjaminchait” and “highfiredanger” at rankings 23 and 25, respectively. The in-degree ranking
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Table 5.4: Rankings of the top 25 users produced by the HITS algorithm on the social graph
collected after the first day of the fire on September 7th, 2010 at 12:40pm Mountain. Column one
includes all users, and columns two and three only include the top N most frequently appearing
users. The fourth column is a reproduction of all users ranked by in-degree from table 4.14 as a
baseline comparison. Users highlighted in bold are part of the qualitatively influential set listed in
table 4.4.
Rank All (821,609) Top 20,000 Top 5,000 In-degree
1 Scobleizer shellykramer andrewhyde Scobleizer
2 shellykramer EthanJaynes shellykramer marcelomedici
3 andrewhyde Scobleizer Mediamum PublishersWkly
4 HowardKurtz andrewhyde cbs4denver HowardKurtz
5 gwenbell studentoflife Scobleizer shellykramer
6 PublishersWkly KaliMarcum downtownboulder taylorphinney
7 EthanJaynes Freedomman11 EthanJaynes EthanJaynes
8 agahran pops131 gwenbell mr q
9 Karoli Mediamum coloradodaily gwenbell
10 davidcohen 2drinksbehind Greeblemonkey FoxSports
11 2drinksbehind cbs4denver dailycamera andrewhyde
12 Greeblemonkey shannonevans studentoflife THEKASESHOW
13 shannonevans gwenbell Tekee Freedomman11
14 Mediamum salivates OnlyInBoulder KaliMarcum
15 bpm140 Greeblemonkey bouldertweep cbs4denver
16 jenmyronuk downtownboulder ejoep craigslistjobs
17 mtlb eraseyourdebt hlane Karoli
18 studentoflife coloradodaily KezzaMcDezza Jastewart15
19 casinclair wind4me jenmyronuk pops131
20 AmeriCares dailycamera 2drinksbehind bigdandbubba
21 KaliMarcum AmeriCares melsidwell salivates
22 taylorphinney hlane davidcohen BellaCullen18
23 wind4me MaxSportsNet wind4me AmeriCares
24 delchoness Tekee fishnette casinclair
25 cbs4denver cabowabochris BarackObama eraseyourdebt
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replaces these two users in the list with “Scobleizer” and “taylorphinney” at rankings 8 and 21,
respectively.
5.2.3 Mentions Activity Graph
The mentions graph is created by parsing the messages created by users speaking of the
Boulder fire during the event looking for usernames that appear anywhere in the text. The same
process is used as the one that generated the data in tables 4.7 and 4.16 except the source user
mentioning that user is saved. An edge source is a user A who has mentioned user B, who is the
target. Multiple edges may be created within a single message if a source user A mentions multiple
users in the text. This graph corresponds to the idea of an “activity network” or “interaction graph”
as described in section 3.12. The idea is to create a graph representation of user interactions in
place of the declared social graph as users only interact with about 10% of their declared friends
[52].
Table ?? shows users in the mentions activity graph ranked in HITS during the first day of the
Boulder fire from September 6th, 2010 at 10:00am Mountain to September 7th, 2010 at 10:00am
Mountain. The first column includes all usernames encountered even if those target users were
not speaking of the Boulder fire, and the second column is the ranking in this graph by in-degree
for comparison. The third column is rankings of only the users speaking of the Boulder fire and
the fourth column is the ranking in this smaller graph by in-degree for comparison. The all-users
mentions graph contains 2,794 users with 4686 edges. The active-users mentions graph contains
261 users with 1,077 edges.
Again, the issue of no real difference between in-degree ranking and HITS is apparent in the
table. Even more of an issue is that the percentage of users actually mentioning others in the active
set, for example, is only 58.25% (261 users out of 448 during the first day). This method of using
mentions has the potential of leaving out influential people who aren’t mentioning others at all, and
yet are interacting heavily in the network during the event. We do see more of the qualitatively
influential users in this table, but we are still missing about half of them (8-9 out of 16).
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Table 5.5: Rankings of the top 25 users produced by the HITS algorithm on the social graph
collected after the first day of the fire on September 7th, 2010 at 12:40pm Mountain. The graph
only includes those users and edges who used a specific keyword in the Boulder fire. The second
column is a reproduction of these users ranked by in-degree from the right half of table 4.14. Users
highlighted in bold are part of the qualitatively influential set listed in table 4.4. Users with an
asterisk are unique per set.
Rank HITS In-degree
1 andrewhyde andrewhyde
2 downtownboulder dailycamera
3 dailycamera downtownboulder
4 coloradodaily coloradodaily
5 fishnette cbs4denver
6 cbs4denver fishnette
7 Mediamum davidcohen
8 Tekee Scobleizer*
9 melsidwell Mediamum
10 OnlyInBoulder OnlyInBoulder
11 davidcohen melsidwell
12 gwenbell Tekee
13 KezzaMcDezza gwenbell
14 jenmyronuk HumaneBoulder
15 bouldertweep epiccolorado
16 hkoren ejoep
17 hlane Greeblemonkey
18 Greeblemonkey gratzo
19 ejoep bouldertweep
20 fionaschlachter jenmyronuk
21 gratzo taylorphinney*
22 HumaneBoulder KezzaMcDezza
23 benjaminchait* hkoren
24 epiccolorado hlane
25 highfiredanger* fionaschlachter
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Table 5.6: Rankings of the top 25 users produced by the HITS algorithm on the mentions activity
graph during the first day of the Boulder fire from September 6th, 2010 at 10:00am Mountain to
September 7th, 2010 at 10:00am Mountain. Columns one and two include all username mentions
even if those users were not speaking of the Boulder fire and ranked by HITS and in-degree,
respectively. Columns three and four only include the users speaking of the boulder fire ranked by
HITS and in-degree, respectively. Users highlighted in bold are part of the qualitatively influential
set listed in table 4.4.
All Users (2,794) Active Users (261)
Rank HITS In-degree HITS In-degree
1 fishnette andrewhyde andrewhyde andrewhyde
2 andrewhyde fishnette fishnette fishnette
3 epiccolorado cbs4denver epiccolorado cbs4denver
4 cbs4denver epiccolorado cbs4denver epiccolorado
5 mediamum mediamum mediamum mediamum
6 denverchannel kwgndenver kwgndenver kwgndenver
7 bouldercounty denverchannel humaneboulder dailycamera
8 kwgndenver jamesazure coloradodaily coloradodaily
9 jamesazure dailycamera dailycamera humaneboulder
10 twitter bouldercounty wind4me kkartphoto
11 shellimeyers coloradodaily hlane wind4me
12 humaneboulder twitter hkoren hlane
13 kgnu humaneboulder campsteve campsteve
14 suzanbond kkartphoto cuindependent downtownboulder
15 sandrafish boulderchannel1 downtownboulder hkoren
16 coloradodaily ev pachecod melsidwell
17 wind4me suzanbond sarajuliet cuindependent
18 hlane redcrossdenver colo kea pachecod
19 hkoren laurasrecipes greeblemonkey greeblemonkey
20 dailycamera denverpost kkartphoto timescall
21 ev wind4me kktv11news sallyfrancklyn
22 boulderchannel1 hlane joshlarson scobleizer
23 campsteve campsteve melsidwell emergcommnetwrk
24 redcrossdenver sandrafish mattbeaty mattbeaty
25 cuindependent downtownboulder tuckertown sarajuliet
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5.2.4 Addressed Messages Graph
The next type of graph to be analyzed is the addressed messages graph. This is a subset
of the mentions graph discussed above as only the messages considered “addressed” to another
user are counted as an edge. Addressed messages are explained in section 4.5.2 and addressed
message counts are shown in table 4.8 for the first day and first week of the Boulder fire. This
exact information of source and target user is used in the creating of the addressed messages graph.
Table 5.7 shows the top 25 recipients of addressed messages during the first 24 hours of the
Boulder fire from September 6th, 2010 at 10:00am Mountain to September 7th, 2010 at 10:00am
Mountain. The first two columns include all users encountered, even if they were not speaking of
the fire. Columns three and four only contain users who were speaking of the Boulder fire. The
all-users graph contains 1,177 users and 1,345 edges, and the active users graph contains 261 users
with 258 edges between them. Again some of the qualitative users are seen in the list, but a number
of them are still missing.
5.3 Analysis and Discussion
Four different types of graphs have been constructed for input into the HITS algorithm: the
global friends/followers graph, the keyword friends/followers graph, the mentions graph and the
addressed messages graph. Including variations of each graph, a total of eight graphs were input
into HITS. For comparison, the rankings by in-degree for each graph was included as a baseline
comparison.
Ranking users by in-degree is not a sufficient measure to find influential users. This problem
has motivated research in areas of betweenness centrality [42], eigenvector centrality calculations
such as HITS here [65] and PageRank [16], or k -shell decomposition [64]. HITS has been used to
analyze the propagation of URLs within Twitter [101], or for finding influential users on the social
graph just like the analysis in this chapter [57].
Although HITS is an attractive algorithm for use in the context of finding influential users
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Table 5.7: Rankings of the top 25 users produced by the HITS algorithm on the addressed mes-
sages activity graph during the first day of the Boulder fire from September 6th, 2010 at 10:00am
Mountain to September 7th, 2010 at 10:00am Mountain. Columns one and two include all target
users of addressed messages even if those users were not speaking of the Boulder fire and ranked
by HITS and in-degree, respectively. Columns three and four only include the users speaking of
the boulder fire ranked by HITS and in-degree, respectively. Users highlighted in bold are part of
the qualitatively influential set listed in table 4.4.
All Users (1,177) Active Users (130)
Rank HITS In-degree HITS In-degree
1 fishnette fishnette fishnette fishnette
2 andrewhyde andrewhyde andrewhyde andrewhyde
3 sarajuliet epiccolorado epiccolorado epiccolorado
4 wind4me wind4me wind4me wind4me
5 eatplaylove joeyschusler mediamum mediamum
6 epiccolorado mediamum sarajuliet cbs4denver
7 stiricide laurasrecipes melsidwell hlane
8 tashigonpo108 eatplaylove cbs4denver sarajuliet
9 vococreative cbs4denver priscillast melsidwell
10 joeyschusler stiricide scobleizer kwgndenver
11 mediamum suzanbond tanukun scobleizer
12 laurasrecipes sarajuliet tekee theinnermarykay
13 davidherrold kwgndenver greeblemonkey suesalinger
14 tekee kyleindenver joshlarson colo kea
15 morganbast hlane wiscobeth lioncaller
16 greeblemonkey melsidwell suesalinger joelwish
17 tanukun sandrafish paullewin mattbeaty
18 bouldercounty suesalinger mattbeaty chrisennis
19 joshlarson kate30 cu joelwish tuckertown
20 scobleizer nuancechaser chrisennis tanukun
21 melsidwell colo kea ofuttufo thenoodleator
22 userealbutter tashigonpo108 pachecod wiscobeth
23 vanillagrrl liminalison michaeldwan joseph flasher
24 kyleindenver scobleizer dhendersonco theroseinbloom
25 priscillast davetaylor nattyz woodardj
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within a specific event, the situation is not analogous to the original problem described by Kleinberg.
The data collection process for this research does include a search performed on the network for
messages matching a set of keywords followed by the collection of the social graph for those users
representing web pages in the original algorithm context, so it appears to be very similar. The
original problem was web page search results on old search engines such as HotBot1 which returned
results based on keyword frequency within the web pages. This led to hosting sites inflating their
result rankings by hiding keywords among the page that are not visible to human readers, but
would be seen by web crawler bots.
The key point as to why the two situations are not analogous is that web pages typically
represent one or very few topics. A node in the input graph is a page, and links to other pages
rarely include pages of a different topic. However, users within social networks represent what
could be considered many different “topics” within their lives and links represent connections to
other users (pages) that are significantly varied between one another. The edges represent many
different relationships, such as co-worker, gaming friend, exercise partner, sister, and many others.
This is the fundamental issue that causes the HITS algorithm to perform no better than ranking
users by in-degree only. HITS by design places all nodes in the same context, and as such the
results are confounded among many relationship types. Further, users tend to link to each other
with very little impetus leading to a very densely connected graph, which is also unlike the internet
web graph.
The conclusion is that the HITS algorithm applied to specific events is not very effective.
However, HITS may still be useful if an even has very large scale, and could possibly cull out users
who may be discussing an event without being involved such as the Haiti earthquakes, for example.
The speed and ability to parallelize the HITS algorithm would make it attractive for this purpose.
Further analysis would be required on the subset of users returned to find influencers within the
context of the event. More analysis is warranted on HITS, but for small events the algorithm is
not effective.
1 HotBot no longer exists in the same form as it did in 1998.
Chapter 6
Context-Specific Indegree Ranking
Here I examine a dynamic approach to finding influential users within a specific context.
The Boulder fire data will once again be used in this analysis. I develop an algorithm that records
the changes over time to the social graph among users speaking of the Boulder fire. The context
of this ranking algorithm is built around the messages collected from the Twitter network using
the keywords described in section 4.5. Every 30 minutes the unique list of users appearing in the
search results were obtained and then those users’ friends and followers lists were collected. In this
chapter only one-day increments are reviewed for brevity.
The idea is to observe the change in the network over time in order to determine who is being
listened to the most. Twitter does not save the timestamp in which a user follows another user
which motivated the 30-minute collection window in order to see the dynamics of the network. In
this chapter the one-day incremental data described in table 4.13 is used for the dynamic analysis.
6.1 Ranking by Global Follower Counts
The first way to look at the dynamics of the network is to simply look at the global friend/fol-
lower counts that appear in the profile for all users. Table 4.1 shows two integer values, friends count
and followers count, corresponding to the current number of friends and followers for a user at the
moment the profile is collected. Algorithm 5 describes the process for counting the change in fol-
lowers count values in profiles collected with the friend/follower lists for each user involved in the
Boulder fire.
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The algorithm takes snapshots of the profiles for each user speaking about the Boulder fire
at the times described in table 4.13 as previously mentioned. For each snapshot, the followers cont
value is stored for each user and changes in this value are computed for each subsequent snapshot.
Users who are added to the network later in the event are simply given count values of −1 and
delta values of 0. Rankings can be computed on either the overall counts or the largest deltas at
any snapshot to inspect what is occurring in the social graph at that moment.
Table 6.1 shows the rankings of users using algorithm 5 over the five network snapshots each
one day apart of the Boulder fire from September 7th, 2010 at 12:40pm Mountain to September
11th, 2010 at 3:10pm Mountain. Only the change in follower counts are shown in the table instead
of the raw counts. Deltas with a value of zero occur due to the user appearing later during the
Boulder fire event and therefore the social graph was not collected at that time. Although we do
see three users from the qualitatively influential set, most users that appear are already popular
in the network in some way. Users such as “NASA”, “Scobleizer” and various news outlets appear
to have large gains in followers globally within Twitter during this time period. Using only profile
follower count metadata, one is unable to determine where these connections are being formed and
why.
6.2 Ranking by Active Users with Pre-existing Network
To improve upon the algorithm given in the previous section, I eliminate edges in the social
graph to users who are not involved in the event. This is a first step in eliminating users who are
globally influential in some manner such as those described in the previous section. The graph
analyzed in this algorithm is identical to the graph in section 5.2.2 as it only considers edges among
users who are speaking of the Boulder fire.
Algorithm 6 describes the process for counting connections made only among those speaking
about the Boulder fire. The algorithm functions differently than the profile algorithm as it operates
on the social graph snapshots collected during the Boulder fire. As users speak of the Boulder fire
using the keywords, they are added to a set of users to be collected. These users are contained in
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Algorithm 5 Calculates the change in the global profile follower count values for users considered
active (using a keyword) during an event.
1: Given the following:
2: List of profile snapshots S
3: Assign snapshotIndex = 0
4: Assign inDegreeCounts = {}
5: Assign inDegreeDeltas = {}
6: for each snapshot Pi ∈ S do
7: for each profile p ∈ Pi do
8: Assign username = p[′screen name′]
9: if username 6∈ inDegreeCounts then
10: Assign inDegreeCounts{username} = []
11: Assign inDegreeDeltas{username} = []
12: for i ∈ range[0,snapshotIndex) do
13: Append −1 to inDegreeCounts{username}
14: if i < snapshotIndex− 1 then
15: Append 0 to inDegreeDeltas{username}
16: end if
17: end for
18: end if
19: Assign count = p{′followers count′}
20: Append count to inDegreeCounts{username}
21: if snapshotIndex > 0 then
22: if inDegreeCounts{username}{snapshotIndex} 6= −1 then
23: Assign delta = count− inDegreeCounts{username}{snapshotIndex− 1}
24: Append delta to inDegreeDeltas{username}
25: else
26: Append 0 to inDegreeDeltas{username}
27: end if
28: end if
29: end for
30: Assign snapshotIndex = snapshotIndex+ 1
31: end for
32: Return inDegreeCounts,inDegreeDeltas
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Table 6.1: Rankings of the top 25 users speaking of the Boulder fire during September 7th, 2010
through September 11th, 2010 by the most followers gained globally within Twitter. Users high-
lighted in bold are from the qualitatively important set listed in table 4.4.
Rank Name Delta 1 Delta 2 Delta 3 Delta 4 Total
1 NASA 0 1818 1532 1732 5082
2 marcelomedici 478 514 404 476 1872
3 THEKASESHOW -12 531 468 530 1517
4 PublishersWkly 281 324 298 269 1172
5 Scobleizer 427 263 233 218 1141
6 HowardKurtz 128 149 169 117 563
7 zaibatsu 0 120 168 221 509
8 alwaysbestrts 0 92 282 120 494
9 DellU MA 0 121 163 108 392
10 adventurevida 0 144 94 123 361
11 fema 0 121 121 90 332
12 thaz7 0 9 259 32 300
13 LGEsolutions 89 46 43 57 235
14 epiccolorado 58 73 89 15 235
15 LauraMoore7 110 30 36 35 211
16 dailycamera 41 46 93 19 199
17 USDAgov 0 81 80 37 198
18 laurasrecipes 0 73 85 37 195
19 taylorphinney 59 55 41 35 190
20 10rWfe 0 24 98 63 185
21 tlrd 0 6 94 78 178
22 HumaneBoulder 77 39 34 27 177
23 MissingScoop 0 26 97 44 167
24 TheFireTracker2 0 4 161 2 167
25 thundercatsnyy 0 32 94 38 164
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the set Uσ in the algorithm. If a user is not a part of this set, she is ignored when counting the
number of followers for an active user in the event. Line 14 shows the calculation of the size of the
set resulting from the intersection of the set of users speaking of the event and the current user’s
follower list from the previous line.
Table 6.2 shows the top 25 users ranked by the number of followers gained in the event
only among users speaking of the event as calculated by algorithm 6 during the same time period
from September 7th, 2010 at 12:40pm Mountain to September 11th, 2010 at 3:10pm Mountain.
The qualitatively influential users who do not fall in the top 25 are listed in the lower section of
the table for reference. Three users are missing completely from the set, specifically kate30 CU,
eadvocate, and BoulderChannel1. These users are missing from most of the data collection due
to errors in the collection process.
Half of the qualitatively influential set are still not appearing high on the rankings list, and a
number of globally influential users are ranked highly once again. This is due to pre-existing edges
counting in favor of users active within the network. The inflation of rank in this regard occurs
when a user begins interacting during the event any time after the start of the event. The situation
occurs as follows:
(1) User A has a pre-existing connection to user B
(2) The Boulder fire event begins
(3) User A speaks of the Boulder fire using a keyword
(4) The social graph for user A is collected along with those of all others speaking of the event
(5) User B speaks of the Boulder fire at some time ∆t after N snapshots of the event network
are taken
(6) The pre-existing edge from user A to user B counts as a gain of one follower for user B
based on the logic in algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 6 Calculates the change in follower lists of the users considered active (using a keyword)
during an event, ignoring all other users who appear in the follower lists and are not speaking of
the event.
1: Given the following:
2: Set of all users Uσ involved in the event
3: List S of sets of users involved at each snapshot of the event
4: List F of user follower sets for each user in Uσ
5: Assign inDegreeCounts = {}
6: Assign inDegreeDeltas = {}
7: for each user ∈ Uσ do
8: Assign currentUsers = []
9: for snapshotIndex ∈ range[0,|F|) do
10: Assign currentUsers = S[snapshotIndex]
11: if user ∈ currentUsers then
12: Assign followers = F{user}[snapshotIndex]
13: Assign common = currentUsers ∩ followers
14: Assign count = |common|
15: Append count to inDegreeCounts{user}
16: else
17: Append −1 to inDegreeCounts{user}
18: end if
19: if snapshotIndex > 0 then
20: Assign prevCount = inDegreeCounts{user}[snapshotIndex− 1]
21: Assign curCount = inDegreeCounts{user}[snapshotIndex]
22: if prevCount 6= −1 and curCount 6= −1 then
23: Append (curCount− prevCount) to inDegreeDeltas{user}
24: else
25: Append 0 to inDegreeDeltas{user}
26: end if
27: end if
28: end for
29: end for
30: Return inDegreeCounts,inDegreeDeltas
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Table 6.2: Rankings of the top 25 users speaking of the Boulder fire during September 7th, 2010
through September 11th, 2010 by the most followers gained only among those speaking of the
Boulder fire. In this ranking, any pre-existing edges between active users that existed before the
start of the fire count as a gain in followers. Users highlighted in bold are from the qualitatively
important set listed in table 4.4.
Rank Name Delta 1 Delta 2 Delta 3 Delta 4 Total
1 cbs4denver 211 4 1 165 381
2 dailycamera 194 2 9 150 355
3 downtownboulder 184 0 2 161 347
4 andrewhyde 185 2 4 145 336
5 coloradodaily 162 0 2 130 294
6 NASA 0 0 0 244 244
7 Scobleizer 101 0 1 138 240
8 HumaneBoulder 107 4 3 95 209
9 OnlyInBoulder 113 0 2 76 191
10 epiccolorado 73 16 15 87 191
11 fishnette 103 4 12 66 185
12 zaibatsu 0 0 1 182 183
13 gwenbell 98 -1 1 72 170
14 CFHeather 0 -1 0 166 165
15 ConnectColorado 0 7 3 152 162
16 Mediamum 82 7 2 70 161
17 hlane 83 5 3 60 151
18 BrettGreene 0 9 5 136 150
19 KDVR 74 2 3 68 147
20 Greeblemonkey 85 -1 3 60 147
21 shellykramer 64 0 0 76 140
22 davidcohen 85 1 0 49 135
23 bouldertweep 67 0 1 57 125
24 DenverChannel 0 3 1 119 123
25 Tekee 72 -1 0 49 120
37 laurasrecipes 0 19 11 75 105
45 metroseen 0 7 1 84 92
57 CampSteve 23 2 3 50 78
59 suzanbond 0 14 9 51 74
80 Org9 0 13 2 43 58
123 sophiabliu 0 2 6 36 44
163 palen 10 0 4 20 34
427 Tanukun 7 3 0 2 12
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6.3 Ranking by Active Users with New Edges
To eliminate the inflation of a user’s in-degree ranking that occurs from the process in algo-
rithm 6, a simple modification is made to the algorithm to prevent pre-existing edges from counting
in favor of a user. Line 9 includes the addition of a new variable that holds a reference to the first
set of followers seen for this user as assigned on lines 13 to 14. This set is used for set subtraction
from any subsequent follower set at any future snapshot which occurs on line 18. This prevents
any pre-existing edge counting in favor of a user.
Table 6.3 shows the rankings of the top 25 users speaking of the Boulder fire during the same
time window. Immediately seen are the top seven users ranked are part of the qualitatively influen-
tial list as well as 12 of the 16 qualitatively influential users appearing within the top 23 users overall.
Aside from the three users who do not appear at all within the data set, user Tanukun appears
very low in the list. All other users that appear in the list are related to the Denver/Boulder area
in some way. News outlets or personnel include users dailycamera, kwgndenver, BrettGreene,
coloradodaily, and cbs4denver. Local city or county organizations include bouldercounty,
bouldercolorado, boulderpolice, and redcrossdenver. The remaining users are all local indi-
viduals: Colo kea, LizEmmettMattox, andrewhyde, and SchwartzNow.
6.4 Analysis and Discussion
The time for each algorithm is similar as each has to iterate over the users in each snapshot,
resulting in a baseline performance of O(ns) where n is the average number of users over all
snapshots, and s is the number of snapshots. This is the performance of algorithm 5 as it only
has to compute count derivatives for the integer value given in each profile snapshot. Algorithms 6
and 7 require extra steps to perform set operations in order to find the users common to both the
current active set and the set of followers for any particular user, and also subtract the pre-existing
edges from user follower sets in algorithm 7. This costs an additional factor d which is the average
in-degree of all users in the set, resulting in an overall running time of O(nsd).
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Algorithm 7 Calculates the change in follower lists of the users considered active (using a keyword)
of an event, ignoring all other users who appear in the follower lists and are not speaking of the
event as well as ignoring any edges that existed between active users before the event started.
1: Given the following:
2: Set of all users Uσ involved in the event
3: List S of sets of users involved at each snapshot of the event
4: List F of user follower sets for each user in Uσ
5: Assign inDegreeCounts = {}
6: Assign inDegreeDeltas = {}
7: for each user ∈ Uσ do
8: Assign currentUsers = []
9: Assign initFollowers = null
10: for snapshotIndex ∈ range[0,|F|) do
11: Assign currentUsers = S[snapshotIndex]
12: if user ∈ currentUsers then
13: if initFollowers = null then
14: Assign initFollowers = F{user}[snapshotIndex]
15: end if
16: Assign followers = F{user}[snapshotIndex]
17: Assign common = currentUsers ∩ followers
18: Assign count = |common \ initFollowers|
19: Append count to inDegreeCounts{user}
20: else
21: Append −1 to inDegreeCounts{user}
22: end if
23: if snapshotIndex > 0 then
24: Assign prevCount = inDegreeCounts{user}[snapshotIndex− 1]
25: Assign curCount = inDegreeCounts{user}[snapshotIndex]
26: if prevCount 6= −1 and curCount 6= −1 then
27: Append (curCount− prevCount) to inDegreeDeltas{user}
28: else
29: Append 0 to inDegreeDeltas{user}
30: end if
31: end if
32: end for
33: end for
34: Return inDegreeCounts,inDegreeDeltas
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Table 6.3: Rankings of the top 25 users speaking of the Boulder fire during September 7th, 2010
through September 11th, 2010 by the most followers gained only among those speaking of the
Boulder fire. In this ranking, only new edges created between active users count as a gain in
followers. Any pre-existing edges between users are ignored. Users highlighted in bold are from the
qualitatively influential set listed in table 4.4.
Rank Name Delta 1 Delta 2 Delta 3 Delta 4 Total
1 epiccolorado 16 16 15 43 90
2 laurasrecipes 0 19 11 32 62
3 HumaneBoulder 17 4 3 26 50
4 fishnette 6 5 14 24 49
5 suzanbond 0 16 10 16 42
6 CampSteve 1 2 3 32 38
7 ConnectColorado 0 7 3 26 36
8 dailycamera 6 2 9 16 33
9 bouldercounty 0 11 9 12 32
10 kwgndenver 3 8 2 11 24
11 bouldercolorado 0 3 9 12 24
12 Org9 0 13 2 9 24
13 BrettGreene 0 9 5 9 23
14 coloradodaily 5 0 2 15 22
15 Colo kea 3 6 1 11 21
16 metroseen 0 7 1 13 21
17 Mediamum 3 8 2 7 20
18 LizEmmettMattox 3 11 1 4 19
19 palen 0 1 4 14 19
20 cbs4denver 4 4 1 9 18
21 andrewhyde 5 3 4 5 17
22 boulderpolice 0 5 4 7 16
23 sophiabliu 0 2 7 7 16
24 redcrossdenver 0 0 3 13 16
25 SchwartzNow 0 3 3 10 16
146 Tanukun 0 3 0 1 4
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As mentioned in section 6.2, users missing from the data collection are due to errors in
the collection process. These errors are easily remedied through more robust collection techniques.
However, given these collection errors, the results of algorithm 7 clearly yield influential users during
an event, specifically 12 out of the 16 qualitatively influential users are found. These results indicate
a significant improvement in ranking over every other metric used in this research, including all
statistical measures in chapter 4, all variations of the HITS algorithm described in chapter 5, and
in first two algorithms presented in this chapter.
However, some limitations of the algorithm exist, as illustrated by user Tanukun. This user
appears very low in the list indicating other features account for this user’s influence that are not
illustrated by this data. Also, this data alone is a summation of the total change in followers by
users active within the event. An improvement to be made on the algorithm is to separate the total
change into separate loss and gain counts of followers among the users speaking of the event. This
could possibly inform of activity that may be considered untenable by users in the network, such
as user BoulderChannel1 who is considered to be a delinquent. A limitation that will never be
addressed is the fact that gains or losses in followers in between snapshot times may be missed if a
single user A un-follows and re-follows user B. Also, this approach does not properly identify users
as being influential who are already influential among the population as it only measures new links
being created in the network during the event. Therefore users like andrewhyde who are locally
popular in Boulder may be very important, but are not discovered through this algorithm.
Aside from the intuitive nature of this algorithm counting the gain in followers during an
event, the rankings can be viewed within the context of a specific snapshot in order to determine
who is entering the network at that time and gaining a following. This approach does not account
for on-going influential measures after a followers are gained, and that information must be gained
through analyzing the content of the messages sent among the network. Also, news outlets appear
in the list, and using other statistical or natural language processing techniques, there may be ways
of categorizing these accounts through their tweeting patterns to find bot or news behavior in order
to remove these users from the rankings.
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The process in algorithm 7 appears to be a good start to finding many influential users, but
will need to be augmented by other means in order to be robust in many varying events.
Chapter 7
Future Work and Conclusions
In this research I have described the four layers of the problem of attempting to infer reputa-
tion on users during an event, reviewed literature for each of the areas touched by those four layers,
investigated the data available on Twitter, analyzed the existing HITS graph ranking algorithm,
and proposed my own ranking algorithm for finding influencers during an event on the Twitter
network verified by qualitative data. This research area is rich with problem areas and hypotheses
to be tested.
7.1 Future Work
The problem space for this research is quite large as described in chapter 2. Numerous
issues arise when trying to answer the questions in each layer as described in figure 2.1. Even
simply finding influencers immediately introduces the problem of understanding why users are
influential. Definitions are also a problem, and must be clearly stated when working on these
issues. The different mechanisms that can be used to define “influence”, such as number of followers,
frequency of tweets, or frequency of username mentions each describe different types of influence,
and clarification of what those types can be is necessary for understanding the different roles that
users may play in the network.
The notion of reputation is becoming increasingly important as numerous organizations and
websites are appearing which are discussing the need of determining online reputation or trying
to quantitatively infer reputation on people or information. Blogger Jeff McCord discusses how
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online information is affecting recruiters interviewing candidates for positions [77]. An example of
a company attempting to quantify reputation of users on Twitter is Klout which has developed
a reputation ranking based on numerous variables similar to those described in chapter 4 [67].
Former Twitter CEO Evan Williams recently mentioned the fact that Twitter maintains internal
reputation scores on users for its own recommendation features [76].
One of the biggest challenges in determining a quantitative reputation score on users or
information is the diversity in how people use social networks. For example, the metrics used in the
Klout score may apply to some users and not others depending on how they interact on Twitter.
For example, the addressed messages as displayed in chapter 4 only account for in 15%-18% of
all messages seen, and among those messages it’s very difficult to determine whether or not the
addressed message is a reply to another message (what Klout considers a spark in “conversation”)
or is simply a targeted initial message from one user to another. The essence of the issue is that the
features of interaction are not equally used by everyone in the network. As such, all scores must
be normalized to what is considered “average” behavior per user. This requires analysis of a user’s
historical activity on the network, much like that seen for user “fishnette” in chapter 4. Figure 4.4
illustrates this point where the average number of tweets per month is much lower than appears
during the Boulder fire at the start of September in the graph.
A second challenge involves determining reputation within the context of a specific event as
investigated in this research. The reputation scores mentioned previously from Klout and Twitter
are for global reputation. This information may be interesting when looking at a user’s activity
over many months or years of activity, but is not useful when analyzing specific events. The same
argument holds true in the issue illustrated by Jeff McCord [77] when potential employers will search
for candidate information online in Facebook or elsewhere which can be taken out of context.
The remaining third major challenge is composing the different measures of user activity
performed in chapter 4 or by techniques used by Klout into a conclusion of trust, reputation, or
influence about a user. Composability was described in section 2.2.1 as the property of combining
measures into a single conclusion just as this. Again, due to the variation of how users behave
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on the network, normalization of activity must be taken into account in order to make sense of
the different activities, and great care must be taken to not confound two types of measures as
measuring the same property of a user. Any measurements must also be explicitly and carefully
defined to remove any ambiguity of what property is being measured about a user.
Reputation must be validated as described as the third layer of the overall problem. This
requires incorporating multiple sources of data in order to cross-reference and verify claims made
by users within the different events that are occurring. A clear direction to take within this layer is
to expand to additional social networks or websites that contain public data in order to illustrate
a broad picture of what is occurring online beyond Twitter. Shared links may be expanded and
followed, major news websites may be tracked for news releases, and blogs may be monitored
for activity around an event. This would require an expansion of data collection and a concise
analysis plan to compose the new and existing data into a coherent form, as each of these different
data sources have different attributes themselves. Blogs tend to be more thoughtful and come
later within an event, and articles posted by news organizations lie somewhere between Twitter’s
real-time user stream and blog posts.
Security is a major concern in all of the three previous layers, but is listed at the top to be the
governor of what information is publicly reported. Algorithm 7 described in chapter 6 is vulnerable
to many types of attacks, such as a simple user interacting using keywords and generating followers
by acting as an information source. More sophisticated techniques such as Sybil attacks would be
easily employed to infiltrate an event activity network to manipulate who are considered influencers
by the algorithm. Additional mechanisms of cross-validation, most likely with user location data
or inference of location using the posted text is necessary in order to try to combat these sorts of
attacks.
The data analysis in chapter 4 is only a first attempt at simple statistics and pattern analysis
to assist in the security and validation layers. Many more interesting multi-variate questions may
be asked of the data such as, “what words or other hashtags co-occur with any particular hashtag
or keyword?”, or “what are the similarities or differences among user profiles or messages of those
137
who speak of the boulder fire?” In fact, many different applications of similarity measures such as
those described in section 3.2 are possible among all the available data.
The methods in chapter 3 are worth exploring in terms of their efficacy and how they may
expose patterns occurring within the users during an event. Analysis could follow a similar style
much like the analysis performed on the HITS algorithm in chapter 5 with implementations and
execution over various forms of the data from Twitter events.
Empirical measurements of the dynamics of the social network occurring during an event
is possible as performed by algorithm 7 presented in chapter 6. With data collected from many
different types of events, models can be developed to simulate activities on the network to predict
where future links may be created, or determine the expected influence of a user or number of users
who may fill those influential roles, all compared to measured empirical data from each event.
Many more techniques are worth investigating and are not fully explored here.
7.2 Conclusions
While the area of reputation scoring has a set of methods as reviewed in chapter 2, the area of
determining reputation through inference is wide open for more investigation. As seen in chapter
2, few researchers can agree on the definitions of trust and reputation which creates difficulty
in defining goals for inferring trust and reputation on users or data which have no associated
explicit ranking scores. Ideas of what is meant by “influence” are also not in agreement, and
many assumptions are made about graph structures that may not make sense in the context of
social network graphs. Notions of centrality and betweenness may have applications in flow-based
networks where the flow of information is governed by explicitly defined behaviors, such as routers
on the internet. However, people are much less predictable in how they decide to allow information
to flow over their links, and as such, each method, tool, or algorithm considered for use must always
be analyzed through this type of lens.
The analysis in chapters 3 through 6 begin to demonstrate that features of the social network
being analyzed (such as Twitter in the case of this research) largely determine how effective the
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available tools and algorithms will be in the analysis. For example, the process in algorithm 7
in section 6.3 would not apply to Facebook, for example, as the design of the friend/follower
relationship is fundamentally different in Facebook and the algorithm would not find influential
users in the same way. In addition to the differences in design, existing features are changed
and new features are added requiring maintenance of existing data collection and algorithms to
accommodate these changes.
The analysis of the HITS algorithm in chapter 5 yields results that do not perform any better
than simply ranking users by their number of followers. Any variation of the social graph, whether
taken from the declared friend/follower lists of users or from interaction graphs from how users are
speaking to each other. These results are due to the fact that the graphs are very densely connected
and do not differentiate between users who are and are not active during an event.
The algorithm developed in chapter 6 proves to be very useful in finding many of the qualita-
tively influential users listed in table 4.4. Although the method has some limitations as described
in that chapter, it is a good first step toward finding influential users to begin to ask the follow-up
question of “why are these users influential?”
To return to the original thesis question, I ask whether or not the question of ”are there
tools available to determine influential users in social networks in the context of a specific event?”
has been answered. The newly developed algorithm in chapter 6 performs well specifically in the
Twitter network in the context of the Boulder fire, finding influencers. However, the question
remains to be answered for future events of types and sizes different than the Boulder fire but
that exist on Twitter. Further algorithms must be developed to incorporate other types of social
networks or websites in use by people involved in these events.
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